DISCOURSE CONNECTORS AND LANGUAGE LEARNING MATERIALS

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wish to stress the importance of incorporating the findings of theoretical research into language teaching materials. The latter objective will be better appreciated if we are reminded of the existing gap between classroom language and language in use. As Crystal (1981:104) put it, informal conversation is a highly distinctive mode of communication, different in many basic respects from the phonological, grammatical and lexical norms that most of us are used to from the handbooks. According to Quirk et al. (1972:656) syntactic devices used for connecting sentences can be grouped under the following headings:

(a) Time and place relaters
(b) Logical connecters
(c) Substitution
(d) Discourse reference
(e) Comparison
(f) Ellipsis
(g) Structural parallelism

We are here concerned, though, with only some of those lexical items realising logical connection that would fall under group (b). Group (b) – logical connecters – is, according to Quirk et al., a group of the class of adverbials whose members are not integrated into the structure of the clause of the sentence, but are peripheral to it. This is clearly shown in figure (1) from Quirk et al. (421):

![Image of figure 1]

This paper concerns itself with a familiar type of explicitly marked cohesive relationships in discourse and conversation, encoded in formal markers like “and”, “but”, “so” and “then”, and the problems that they may engender for foreign language learners if their diverse functions are not taken into consideration when constructing learning materials. Although there is an increasing awareness of their significance in natural conversation (Crystal and Davy, 1975, Crystal, 1981, Schiffrin, 1986), such particles have not been duly appreciated either in grammar books or in theoretical linguistic research; consequently, the accounts we have on hand of these items are neither comprehensive nor adequate.

The motivation for this investigation, therefore, is twofold: Firstly, we wish to draw attention to the wide ranging function of these items, not only as lexical items with semantic content, but also as devices used in structuring our conversational moves (Franck, 1979), a point that does not seem to have been appreciated in the literature up till now. Secondly, we...
Quirk et al. (661) note that

most of the other types of logical connectives can be grouped under these coordinators in as much as a similar interpretation could obtain if the coordinator alone is used.

However, it might be worth tracing back the history of these lexical items. It is well known that connectives have attracted the attention of philosophers and linguists alike. As far as philosophical quarters are concerned, sentence connectives have given a lot of headaches to those logicians and linguistic philosophers who attempted to account for them in formal terms. Allwood et al. (1977:26) for example, write that in logic

a sentential connective is a word or phrase usually belonging to the traditional grammatical category of conjunction.

Logicians tried to account for the meanings of most of those items in terms of the five connectives:

the conjunction (and): \& ; A
the disjunction (or): V
the implication (if...then): \rightarrow
the equivalence (if and only if): \equiv
the negation (not): \sim

which is not really a connective as it usually operates on one sentence.

Evidently, the requirement in logic is that connectives be truth-functional, a condition which implies that they “be given” a fixed and definite meaning. In philosophical semantics, dealing with semantics of coordination has meant mostly identifying linguistic connectives with logical operators and then taking over the meaning of truth-functions from logic into linguistics. This approach, quite clearly, has not been satisfactory as it does not provide any insights into the wide-ranging use of connectives in ordinary language.

The problems besetting such accounts, which are well known, gave rise to various theories and, most notably, Grice’s theory of the logic of conversation, which claimed to account for the non-truth-functional meanings of sentence connectives in conversational terms by utilizing such concepts as those of conventional and conversational implicatures. Although this kind of approach opens up the scene to the intriguing world of pragmatics, it nevertheless sweeps the most interesting facts about connectives under the carpet as its main concern is to safeguard logical semantics rather than explain facts imposing on pragmatic aspects of the use of language.

Leaving aside this tradition for a moment and turning to the linguistic quarters, one might say that here connectives have always been viewed as syntactic devices used for connecting grammatical structures (constructions) (Chomsky, 1957, 1965, Gleitman, 1961, 1965, Harris, 1964). However, there has been an increasing realisation that, if connectives operate at all at the level of discourse – and they certainly do – i.e., if connectives function as text creating devices, we shall have to dismiss the assumption that they are mere syntactic devices, as they connect sentences by which text is “realised” or in which text is coded. As Halliday and Hasan (1976:2) (henceforth H&H) would say “a text does not consist of sentences; it is realised by or encoded in sentences”; and although there are one sentence-texts, these are rather rare. Most texts extend beyond the limits of a single sentence. Thus recourse solely to the notion of grammatical structure will not suffice to account for cohesion between sentences. And since cohesion is a semantic relation according to this view, cohesive devices, and in this case connectives, are semantic units, too.

However, one might say that the two traditions, the one originating from the philosophical quarters and this latter one originating from the linguistic quarters, seem to be merging at this point in quest of a comprehensive account.

Thus, assuming for a moment that connectives are semantic units, the question posed is what their meaning is. A cursory look into the relevant literature, however (G. Lakoff, 1971, R. Lakoff, 1971, Dascal and Katriel, 1977, Van Dijk, 1977a,b, 1979, Lang, 1984), will suffice to convince us that an adequate account of their meaning, solely in semantic terms, does not seem to be forthcoming, and that we have to resort to pragmatic factors, as well. After all, semantic connectives are mainly operative intertextually, i.e., within the confines of the sentence (Van Dijk, 1977b), whereas connectives functioning intersententially may be called pragmatic or discourse connectives, although there is by no means a general agreement on this issue (R. Lakoff, 1971, Dascal and Katriel, 1977).
Indeed, both the meaning and the function — if such a distinction is viable — of connectors are elusive. They certainly connect; but what do they connect? One might, summing up, identify the following options:

(a) They connect structures/constituents of a similar level.
(b) They connect sentences truthfunctionally.
(c) They connect sentences or clauses whose semantic content should have sufficient in common to justify this relation. This relation is to be understood broadly. For example, in cases of “but” the semantic content may be antithetical but there must still be enough in common to warrant the connection. Or
(d) A pragmasemantic account can be given: as in (c) but all extra, non-truthfunctional meanings are accountable in terms of expectations (R. Lakoff, 1971), implicatures or implicatures (Grice, 1975), presuppositions, and so on.

Since the most challenging course, however, seems to be the one proposed in (d), let us take the main connectives one by one and state their semanticpragmatic meaning. Under the heading of “Some common conjunctive elements’ H&H mention “and”, “but”, “so”, “then”, and “yet”:

AND: “And” is the connector *par excellence* (Lang, 1984). As can be seen in figure (2) (Quirk et al., 1972:661), which displays the logical relationships that can be realised by connective items, its function is quite diverse:

![Logical relationships](image)

However, it is worth bearing in mind that not all these functions are realised by “and”. Some are realised by other conjuncts whose logical meaning is that of “and”. H&H refer to the conjunctive “and” by the more general term *additive* “to suggest something rather looser and less structural than is meant by *coordinate*”. They write (234):

> When the “and” relation operates conjunctively, between sentences, to give cohesion to a text — or rather to create text, by cohering one sentence to another — it is restricted to just a pair of sentences. This provides an indication of the difference between “and” as a structural relation (coordinate) and “and” as a cohesive relation (additive).

“And” can also be found in adversative use. Van Dijk (1977b:211) identifies the following functions of “and”:

a) it can introduce a proposition denoting preceding facts, utterances (addition, continuation).
b) it can relate implicitly speech-acts.
c) it can enumerate.
d) it can change the topic/perspective.

However, it is not clear why he should state (b) separately since this function seems to spill over the rest, it is of a different nature and level, and it therefore cannot be put on a par with the rest.

BUT: Although “and” may be considered to be the connector *par excellence* (Lang, 1984), we tend to regard “but” as more problematic for learning materials; that is, it performs a greater variety of functions, as will be seen; it is both syntactically and semantically more restricted and less basic, and it cannot be as easily omitted as can “and”. In other words, “and” can be said to be partially contained in the meanings of other connectives. Not so with “but”.

The meaning of “but” has often been described as “adversative” (H&H, Brown and Yule, 1983) or “contrary to expectation” (R. Lakoff, 1971, H&H). R. Lakoff (1971) distinguishes between two types of “but”: (a) the semantic opposition “but” and (b) the denial of expectation “but”.

Traditionally, “but” has been treated as a conjunctive element, and in logic it is identified with “and”. As H&H (250) note, “but” contains the element ‘and’ as one of its meaning components. However, Dressler (1981) claims that “but” signals contrajunction rather than conjunction.
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According to H&H "but" can occur in a contrastive sense. They distinguish between two aspects in the use of the conjunction in general: the internal aspect, which relates to the communication process itself, and the external aspect, which relates to the thesis or context of what is being said. However, we will take up this point later in this paper.

H&H claim that the sense of "but" in terms of expectations has to do with the internal aspect of the communication process involved, as shown in figure (3), adapted from H&H:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 3**

SO: "So" means "as a result of this", "for this reason", and "for this purpose" (H&H: 257). With reference to this connective H&H admit that the external/internal distinction becomes less clearcut. "So" can also mean (internally, like "then") "I gather", "I conclude from what you say" (H&H: 257). "So", according to Van Dijk (1977a: 210), may, together with "therefore":

(a) introduce conclusions denoting consequences of certain facts.
(b) introduce inferred reasons/causes.

THEN: "Then" can express a conditional relation, meaning "under these circumstances" (H&H: 258). But it essentially typifies the temporal conjunctive relation, expressed in the simplest form.

Having stated clearly the main aspects of meaning of some conjunctive elements and made sure that they have been incorporated into our teaching materials, one might wonder what other problems could arise. After all, Lang (1984:15-16) in a most comprehensive study of the semantics of coordination writes:

Coordination embraces a whole set of regularities which seem to be shared by all familiar languages and which are manifested in such a general way in the grammars of particular languages that they have in fact often simply gone unnoticed. In foreign language handbooks or grammars for example it seemed less necessary to explain the regularities of coordination than other grammatical phenomena. The pupil's own practical ability to coordinate shows that omissions in this area are possible without much risk, if one simply relies on the competence in the pupil's native language which he projects onto the foreign language. Clearly, that would not have happened with the obviously more language-specific phenomena of first-order syntax, e.g. internal phrase structure or word order in simplex sentences, let alone morphology.

One would not, even for a moment, doubt the validity of his last statement arguing for the priority in language teaching of the "more language specific phenomena of first-order syntax". But how about the rest? One is inclined to think that, when Lang talks of "the pupil's own practical ability to coordinate" and his/her ability to project his/her L1 competence onto the foreign language, what he has in mind is sentence coordination, a phrasal conjunction (=coordination of categories below the sentence) semantically speaking, sentences not only as "grammatically determined" forms but also as utterances conveying messages" (24). But will this con figuration of sentences into utterances conveying messages in terms of which connectives can be said to be explicable suffice?

In any case, it is rather presumptuous to make such a claim, even if the scope of coordination is doubly restricted to sentence coordination, on the one hand, and to its manifestation in written language, on the other. On should remember at this point that sentence connectivity has been identified as an area of grammar creating major problems in native language acquisition, let alone foreign language learning. In fact, it was found (Crystal, 1981) that "the means the children used to connect their sentences were inadequate" (ibid.: 38).

With the exceptions of Quirk et al. (1972) and H&H (1976), which bring this problematic area to the fore, Crystal (1981) notes that this problem neglected at large in traditional handbooks. Therefore, it can be safe concluded that it is an unfortunate 'conjecture' to claim, as Lang does, that L1 competence at sentence connectivity can be projected onto the foreign language, a 'conjecture' which is easily 'refuted' — to quote Popper — if one takes into consideration that sentence-sequencing is a major problem in native language acquisition.
As regards semantic connectives, Van Dijk (1979:449) writes that:

Unlike the classical connectives of logical languages, they are not truth-functional, but intensional. That is, they are described in terms of meaning relations and denoted fact relations (e.g. possibility, probability, necessity of their conditional link).

Van Dijk (1979) and McCear (1980), however, have pointed out that what are usually called conjunctions may sometimes relate speech acts rather than syntactic units, or semantic units, such as propositions. In such cases they be better termed pragmatic connectives. Let it be noted that apart from a few researchers like Van Dijk most theoreticians do not distinguish between semantic and pragmatic connectives. Van Dijk bases his distinction on criteria deriving from speech-act theory.

In the remaining part of this investigation, therefore, we will turn our attention to the diverse functions of what have been called semantic connectives (intensional) and/or pragmatic connectives. However, the focus will be placed on “but” because we think that it can be regarded as the paradigm of conjunction. The findings can be considered to be an epitome of the diversity of functions of other connectives, too.

H&H distinguish between semantic and pragmatic connectives in terms of a distinction they draw between the external and the internal aspects of the communication process. It is here claimed that this distinction stands on rather shaky grounds and, as they themselves admit, it is less clearcut with relation to the additive, adversative and causal types of conjunction, although they argue that “it is still exact enough for many of the same conjunctive expressions to be used in both meanings” (240). At times they talk of examples of conjunction in which the conjunctive element is said to be on the borderline; for example, with regard to (5.8) (their numbering), which they find to be on the borderline.

(5.8) He heaved the rock aside with all his strength. And there in the recesses of a deep hollow lay a glittering heap of treasure,

they write that “here ‘and’ does link two different facts, which makes it external, but at the same time it may serve to convey the speaker’s intention that they should be regarded as connected in some way” (245).

It is worth noting in this respect, however, that, since texts do not occur in limbo but are always the product of some speaker or writer, the connective elements therein always serve to convey the speaker’s or writer’s intention that the facts described or referred to should be regarded as connected in the way indicated by the conjunct. For example, if I say

She is poor and honest,

I thereby indicate that the two facts stated are, or are to be taken as, connected in the specific way indicated by “and”, whereas if I say

She is poor but honest,

I thereby indicate that they are, or are to be taken as, related in the specific way indicated by my use of “but”. In other words, there is no externally/ideationally determined criterion indicating that the two facts/states of affairs therein described are a priori related in any specific way.

A distinction between the internal and external use of conjunctive elements along the lines advocated by H&H can be shown to be valid with respect to clear cases of reports, and even in such cases it is not always obvious whether conjunctive elements should be attributed to the speaker/writer or the initial speaker of the oratio recta (Kits, 1982:ch.2).

One might suggest, however, that looking at the conjoined clauses or sentences from the perspective of speech acts might prove more constructive; this approach might brush aside H&H’s attempts at explaining internal conjunction as bearing “the speaker’s attitude to or evaluation of what he is saying” (246), as they put it with regard to (5.20) (their numbering):

(5.20) I couldn’t send all the horses, you know, because two of them are wanted in the game. And I haven’t sent the two Messengers either.

But what is the function of pragmatic connectives?
Van Dijk (1979) makes a distinction between semantic and pragmatic connectives, as has been noted, and claims that the latter "express relations between speech acts, whereas semantic connectives express relations between denoted facts". And he adds that "this characterization is intentionally vague" (449).

It is suggested here that this distinction is too vague to be of any real significance, as was hinted at above. Contrary to Leech (1983), who rightly thinks that a great deal of pragmatic phenomena become "grammaticalized" in linguistics, it is here claimed that Van Dijk (1979) "pragmaticizes" what...
are in fact grammatical phenomena, i.e., according to his account it is obvious that "semantic connectives express relations between denoted facts", as he puts it, because he identifies those connectives as semantic ones that connect structures of the same level (see Fries, 1952), or their transformational variants. However, this is a point that need not be pursued here as it would lead us astray.

Rejecting, therefore, any such clear distinction between semantic and pragmatic connectives, it is of no consequence for the purposes of this study whether we opt to retain a meaning-maximalist or -minimalist position in accounting for connectives (cf. Posner, 1980). What is significant, though, is to become aware of the 'magic', be it semantic or pragmatic, of these items, and then attempt to incorporate its full range into our teaching materials.

In exploring the functions of connectives we must shift our ground: the emphasis must be placed on coherence rather than cohesion (cf. H&H); and the unifying, underlying assumption of discourse analysts is, or rather should be, that coherence is to be located, not at the linguistic level, but rather at the level of interactional moves. Thus, obligatory sequencing is to be found between the moves that are realised by utterances or speech acts, on occasion by a behavioural 'utterance', as when B hands over a book to A in response to A's utterance 'Give me the book'.

Likewise, connectors are not mere structural units, or semantic units fraught with pragmatic implications. In our view they act as devices on an interpersonal level – to borrow Halliday's term – to help orientate the listener towards mapping the right (i.e., intended) speech act, or move, into the utterance unit. Their function, as will be shown, is much more diverse than has been described in the literature.

A sentence can realise just one speech act, or on occasion more than one speech act, and the same is true of clauses, too. Discourse connectors often function in such a way as to orientate the hearer towards interpreting the speaker's utterance as performing more than one speech act (cf. Fill's, 1986, notion of divided illocution).

It is suggested here that quite often it is a myth to say that the meaning of "but" shows a contrast between what precedes it and what follows, irrespective of whether this aspect of meaning is semantically accounted for, or explained away in terms of conventional implicatures. And this is the approach taken by most theoreticians in accounting for such lexical items.

However, there is more at stake. An example of a purportedly clear case of semantic opposition "but", (1) (R. Lakoff, 1971) joining two clauses, or even two constituents, will illustrate this point further:

(1) She is a woman but she is intelligent.
(2) Speaker A: She is a woman.
Speaker B: But she is intelligent.
(3) She is a woman; so she is intelligent.

What is asserted in (1) by the two clauses is of minor significance compared to what is asserted, implicated, presupposed, or what have you, by the use of "but". Or else, what makes you want to call the utterer of (1) a male-chauvinist pig while the one of (3) a feminist, or a female chauvinist to use a novel term. Let it be noted that (1) might be split between two speakers at two distinct turns at talking (Sacks et al., 1974) as in (2) in which speaker B is counteracting the argument with a "but"-initiated speech act. This latter example helps to emphasize the significance of "but" which cannot be dumped into a hold-all of indiscriminate implicatures.

In brief, even with respect to what have been called semantic connective i.e., connective elements conjoining clauses, or sentences, or their transformational variants, within the same utterance, or turn at speaking, the seem to be problems. These problems often arise from the organization of our background knowledge which is brought to bear in the form of constraints on the process of conjoining facts or states of affairs in our linguistic productions, as well as the process regarding their interpretation; to background knowledge, it must be noted, is often culture-specific. V. Dijk (1979:448) writes in this respect:

Connection constraints in discourse are based on the requirement that the respective facts they denote are, e.g. conditionally, related. Often this connection can only be established, formally, on the basis of other facts, which must, so to speak, be interpolated into the (pressed) propositional sequence on the basis of our knowledge of the world (as it is organized in so-called scripts or frames)°.

The merit of this statement can be clearly demonstrated if one consider similar examples to (4):

(4) I bought a house yesterday but the carburetor needs fixing.

which are excluded as inappropriate by coherence constraints stems from the organization of our stereotypic knowledge (Kitis, 1987).
Moreover, connectors can orientate the hearer towards interpreting the speech act realised by the specific utterance as addressing, not the illocutionary force of the preceding utterance, but any of the perlocutionary intents the previous speaker might have in issuing the utterance. This is demonstrated in the following real data from my eight-year-old son, British born, British raised, picking up a Marks and Spencer’s jar of jam in a local supermarket back in Greece, where imported brands cost thrice as much as the local ones:

Self: Marks and Spencer’s jam is very expensive.
Son: But I like it.

Intonation plays a significant role as does sequencing, but one would not want to deny that surface markers, not only “direct the reader’s/hearer’s expectations and help him to integrate adjacent sentences” as Haberlandt (1982:241) would claim, but they also help to direct the interpretation of the utterance as addressing the underlying/secondary – one might in fact claim, along with Searle (1979), primary – illocutionary force. In other words, connectors, alias surface markers, can alter the whole pattern of the communication process. It is worth noting that connectors in this specific use, with the possible exception of “so”, seem to be lacking from defence sequences in cross-examinations in court where the need for a precise, single-level functioning usage of language is overwhelming (cf. Atkinson and Drew, 1979).

Connectives can also trigger a next speaker’s turn which will specifically address not what is said in the previous speaker’s turn but what is communicated by the use of the connective. Consider, for example, the following oft-cited example (real data):

Fragment A:
A: I’m a nurse but my husband won’t let me work.
B: How old are you?

Moreover, connectors do not activate solely the interpretation of an utterance as performing two acts or as initiating two moves; they can also mediate the interpretation of a move as being related, not to the one preceding it, but rather to a previous one realised by a distant utterance. Consider, for instance, fragment B (real data) where you have a series of nested sequences (Sacks, ms) before BC can actually plug his next utterance into his earlier one by means of an “and”, or in fragment C (real data) Janet’s use of “but” in her last turn:

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**Fragment B:**

B.C. I think it go goes way back to the last generation – I think so anyway – because from hearin’ my father talk – in our days – on the Northside – when I when I was born, my people were living, in the pub – on the corner of Gardiner Street and Summerhill –

G.F. now, which one, there are three o’ them

B.C. if you’re going from from from O’Connell Street –

G.F. yeah

B.C. It’s, the one on the right hand side on the far side of Gardiner Street –

G.F. oh, I know it yeah

→ B.C. a hundred and seventeen – and, that was a very respectable area to live in – now they only had, one room and a small room off it – but, it it was the ehh you know he was a tradesman an artisan – a and eh – he was, you know in his own little class he was he was accepted because, he had a good steady job and all this sort of stuff and therefore he wasn’t, common, you know – but, before the war that whole area was cleared out and then was rebuilt, well now you couldn’t say Summerhill today is a pleasant area to live in – you see but obviously it was then.


**Fragment C:**

Janet: Guess why I’m calling.
Larry: I know cuz I didn’t do my math.
Janet: Well, how w’d I know I wasn’t at school tihday.
Larry: Oh.
Janet: Right.
Larry: Right.
Janet: hhh Bud I am calling about math.
Larry: I knew it.

(G. Jefferson, Conference in Sociology, University of Warwick. 19 Feb. 1979)
Connectives, and most prominently "but", can not only highlight a divided illocution or an indirect response (Searle 1975, Bach and Harnish 1979) but they can also signal that an indirect response or divided illocution has been taken up:

A: There's a party at Robin's tonight.
B: But I've got an exam tomorrow morning.
A: But you don't have to stay long.

Therefore, as far as their functional aspect (semantic-pragmatic content) is concerned, connectors can be said to have the following main functions:

*Discourse connectors:*

(a) can help the hearer to form a type of a bridging assumption which will mediate the understanding/processing of a piece of language as discourse or of a sequence of utterances as forming discourse.

(b) can forecast the speaker's move. On occasion the clause they grammatically introduce may be transposed and they can then be called free-standing (fragment D).

(c) can act as devices enabling the hearer to map the right (intended) speech-act or move into the utterance unit.

(d) can orientate the hearer towards interpreting the speech-act realised by the specific utterance as addressing, not the illocutionary force, but the perlocutionary intent of the previous speaker.

(e) can orientate the hearer towards deciphering the speaker's utterance as performing more than one speech-act.

(f) can trigger a next speaker's turn which will address not what is said in the previous utterance but what is 'communicated' by the use of the connector (fragment A).

(g) can join 'clauses' across turns (fragment B).

Fragment D:

A.M. Yes the children like them very much, so – I think as long as one is careful – very careful, oh yes, it's all right.

(Crystal and Davy, 1975:28)
At this juncture one might raise the question as to the utility of all the above facts regarding connectives in constructing our teaching materials. After all, it might be counterargued, learners are – irrespective of what their native language is – cognitively well equipped to successfully process any piece of conversation provided they know the semantic meaning of the lexical items involved. But does this claim correspond to the facts?

Language learning materials have been primarily based on written language whose linguistic phenomena cannot always be identified with the phenomena of spoken discourse. The account of both lexical and syntactic characteristics of English which feature prominently in learning materials has been drawn from sentence grammars, which have been dominant for the last two thousand years of linguistic study, for “we are ... a civilization of the written word” (Barthes, 1967:10).

However, grafting connectives as used in sentence-based grammars into learning materials creates problems: In written language there is a variety of types of coordination realised by distinct, linguistically coded types, whereas in spoken language the great majority of the functions of those types of coordination is reduced to the widening of functions of only a few connectives, i.e., “and”, “but”, and sometimes “so” and “if”. And it is just because these connectives are so common in speech that they are called upon to cover a very wide range of functions.

However, there are problems besetting communication in a foreign language environment relating both to processed, inferred aspects of meaning, such as presuppositions, implicatures, or appeal to stereotypes, as well as to conversational strategies employed by the speakers of the linguistic communities. These problems can be alleviated by applications of insights gained from the area of pragmatics and conversational analysis. The underlying assumption is that even if such processes as inferred aspects of meaning are universal practice, there must still be significant differences relating to the cues the employment of which will activate them. As to the interactional strategies deployed by speakers of specific linguistic communities, it is here assumed that their extent of divergence must be too significant to be overlooked in learning materials. As Levinson (1982:370) rightly notes regarding one aspect of the problem raised in this study there thus arises the possibility of a systematic contrastive pragmatics that would isolate potential areas of misunderstanding arising from the learner’s assumption that a construction in the language being learnt will have the same implicatures, presuppositions, illocutionary...
7. In fairness to H&H it must be noted that they do not talk of semantic and pragmatic connectives, neither do they equate their distinction between internal and external aspects of the meaning of connectives with any distinction between semantic and pragmatic connectives. However, we think this is a fair approximation (also see Schiffrin, 1982:66).

8. On scripts and frames (there is a distinction to be made between the two) see Schank and Abelson (1977) and Minsky (1980) respectively.

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