

## **On the MG conditional connective *αν* or towards restoring the image of the Greek culture\***

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### **Abstract**

There has been a claim regarding the monosemicity or un-ambiguousness of the connective *αν*/an of Modern Greek (MG), as compared to its translational equivalent if in English – with the additional claim that the Greek culture is far less ambiguous than the English (Athanasiadou, 1997). In this paper, my aim is to restore the picture of the MG conditional connective *αν*/an, on the basis of an examination of real data, demonstrating that, despite the existence of connectives such as *ενώ*, ‘while’, *αφού*, ‘since’, and *άμα* ‘if’[cond.temporal]), MG *αν* can function, not only as a conditional connective, but also as a concessive and adversative one, signifying factuality as well, just like its English counterpart. Moreover, I will advance the thesis that both English if and MG *αν* are used in contrastive and concessive contexts, as well as conditional ones, as strategic devices of rhetorical structures.

**Key words:** conditionality, adversativity, concessivity, if, *αν*, rhetorical constructions, antinomial constructions, hypotheticality, Modern Greek

### ***Notice on my son’s door***

If you are, a pervert, a crook, a creep, a swindler, a slave trader, a Colombian drug lord, a smuggler, a pimp, a burglar, a drifter, a tramp, a drunkard, Hitler, a Nazi, a lazy bum, a communist, and especially a *member of this family...KEEP OUT!!!*

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## 1. Introduction

This paper has a rather ‘interventionist’ character, as it is a response to claims made by Athanasiadou (1997) henceforth AA, in relation to the main monolexemic conditional subordinator of Modern Greek (MG) *αν*/*an* or *εάν*/*ean*, the translational equivalent of English *if*<sup>1</sup>.

While the latter has been claimed by several researchers to function, not only as a conditional connective, but also as a concessive and adversative one, signifying factuality, on the other hand, MG *an* has been claimed to unambiguously signify conditionality, but not concession or adversativity. On account of the alleged validity of this finding, also allegedly supported by an examination of other MG concessive connectives, that is, on the assumption that the domains of conditionality, concession or adversativeness are non-overlapping, divergent domains in Greek, the additional claim has also been advanced that the Greek culture is far less ambiguous than the English one (AA).

Conditional sentences are the foundation of logic, the cornerstone of syllogistic reasoning, and as such conditionals are the mortar of causation, explanation, confirmation, disposition, general laws and universal quantification. Conditionals are pivotal in scientific explanation, too, and all these areas mentioned here form a compact cluster of related issues in philosophy, in general: in metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, but also in psychology and, more recently, in cognitive science and knowledge representation systems (Elio and Pelletier 1997). This awareness then sanctions the epithet ‘primordial’ for the conditional connective (Kitis 1999).

Conditionals, just like all the other logical connectives, are truth functional. The conditional is true in all cases except when the antecedent is true and the consequent false.

Why are conditionals then so significant in all these domains? The answer has to lie in its potential for projecting the human mind into realms yet untrodden, in other words into the realm of irrealis, possible worlds, alternative worlds, fictional worlds. If this is so, then conditional markers must have a non factual value, i.e. they must signal conditionality, hypotheticality, speculation, etc. Indeed, in Greek the same marker is used for indirect questions, conditional sentences and wishes. This is not surprising (cf. Akatsuka 1986, Traugott 1985, Wakker 1994) as conditions

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<sup>1</sup> For the time being we assume that the two subordinators are equivalent variants, though this need not be so (cf. Nikiforidou and Katis 2000, although I would not subscribe to their claims, see Κουτούπι-Κητή [Koutoupi-Kitis] 2002).

and indirect questions point to disjunctive situations signaling uncertainty, on one hand, while wishes are placed in the sphere of irrealis, on the other.

In what follows I will address this issue of factuality in relation to conditional sentences. I will demonstrate that, despite what has been said and the inherent irrealis character of conditional markers, the MG conditional marker (e)an can be used in contexts in which the protasis of the conditional denotes factual states of affairs or events. In other words, it can be used as a reality conditional marker introducing factual protasic propositions. This should not be surprising in view of similar potential of the English conditional marker *if*. *If* and similar markers in other languages (Saloné 1983) have been shown to be able to signify factuality, too, contingent on contextual factors or even on co-textual ones; that is, it is often the case that the surrounding co-text gives rise to a factual interpretation of *if*. The potential for signifying factuality is a prerequisite for a conditional marker to develop meanings in the domains of concessivity and adversativity.

However, it has been claimed by AA that “in Greek there is no such case as *if* extending to concession or adversativeness, and thus causing ambiguities. As far as adversativeness is concerned, in Greek this is a domain with no overlapping or convergence with the other two domains [conditionality, concessivity]” (14). On the basis of this claim AA advances an argument relating to the nature of the two cultures. She concludes:

“The present paper was an attempt to show that the ... three conceptual domains [conditionality, adversativity, concessivity] are independent domains but they exhibit different pictures in different languages. In English the domains converge towards one another, which adds to the assumption that the English culture seems to be a far more ambiguous culture compared with the Greek one in which the domains diverge from one another”. (14)

The aim of this paper is precisely to show that her claim relating to the divergence of the domains in Greek is unfounded and further that any claims relating to the diminished ambiguity of the Greek culture on account of the absence of convergence of such domains is, to say the least, unfortunate. In what follows, I will first re-identify (following the literature) the contexts in which *if* has been found to develop concessive and adversative meanings, and then examine the behaviour of MG (e)an in such contexts. It will be shown that the MG conditional connective, too, displays a similar behaviour, developing both concessive and adversative meanings. I will also briefly review AA’s proposed classification of MG concessive conditionals in order to demonstrate the vacuity of both the criteria assumed and the emergent classification. In the next section,

however, I will present König's (1986) classification of types of conditional and concessive clauses and their typical properties, as a starting point for this discussion.

## 2. Basic distinctions

König (1986) distinguishes several types of conditionals on the basis of the semantic relation between the component clauses of the complex conditional construction:

- a. Conditionals, which entail neither their antecedents nor their consequents.
- b. Concessive irrelevance conditionals, which share properties with either type a or type c. As a result this type is often classified either with type a or type c.<sup>2</sup>
- c. Concessives, which entail both their component clauses.

While in simple conditionals of type a the consequent is related to a certain condition, in type b, concessive irrelevance conditionals, the consequent is related to a set of conditions. This set can be specified by a disjunction (1a), a universal or 'free-choice' quantifier (1b), or a focus particle as in (1c):

1. a. Whether he is right or not, we must support him.  
     b. However much advice you give him, he does exactly what he wants to do.  
     c. Even if you drink (only) a little, your boss will fire you (König 1986: 231)

As is clear, concessive conditionals entail their consequents and are truth functional, since in logic it is sufficient that the consequent be true even when the antecedent is false for the conditional sentence to be true.<sup>3</sup> So this type satisfies material implication conditions:

2. Irrespective of whether p or  $\sim$ p, q.

According to König, this analysis is supported by morphological evidence as well. Indeed, in Greek, too, the connectives used for structures such as (1a) are derived from the conditional marker:<sup>4</sup>

- 1ai. *Είτε έχει δίκιο είτε δεν έχει, πρέπει να τον υποστηρίξουμε.*  
     'Whether he is right or not, we must support him'

*είτε*(eite) derives from the Ancient Greek (AG) conditional connective *es*(ei):

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Fraser (1969).

<sup>3</sup> Here we assume that conditionals have truth conditions ignoring other views (Mackie 1962, Edgington 1986,1995).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Wakker (1994). Such clauses introduced by *eite* (either, or) are termed conditional clauses in Tzartanos (1946[1989]) and Holton et al. (1997).

$\varepsilon\sigma$	<	$\varepsilon\sigma$	+	$\tau\varepsilon$
either	<	if(disj)+		and(conj.)

Table 1 from König (: 234) summarizes the various properties of the three types:

**Table 1.** Types of conditionals

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- I. a. Conditionals
- i. typical form: if p, (then) q
  - ii. entailments: -
- b. Concessive (irrelevance) conditionals
- i. typical form:
    1. Whenever p or  $\sim$ p, q
    2.  $(\forall x)$  (if p, q)
    3. Even if p, q
  - ii. entailments: q
  - iii. implicature: (x) (if x, then normally  $\sim$ q)
- c. Concessives
- i. typical form: even though / although p, q
  - ii. entailments: p, q
  - iii. presupposition: if p, then normally  $\sim$ q<sup>5</sup>
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As König (1986) notes, conditionals introduced by simple connectives are not normally interpreted as concessive conditionals. For example, (3) and (4) are very different in their interpretations, even though truth functionally they are equivalent:


3. *Av πεις κρασί, δεν θα έρθω.*  
 ‘If you drink wine, I’m not coming’.
4. *Ακόμα κι αν πεις κρασί, δεν θα έρθω.*  
 ‘Even if you drink wine, I’m not coming’.

The differential interpretation lies in what Geis and Zwicky (1971) called ‘invited inference’ or ‘conditional perfection’. (3) invites the inference that if it is not the case that p, then there will be no q: (i)  $P \supset Q$  invites an inference of the form  $\sim P \supset \sim Q$ .

This inference or Gricean generalized conversational implicature does not arise in the case of concessive conditionals, and an example such as (4) resists such an implicature, or does not invite such inferences. This is shown in the figure below:

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<sup>5</sup> I must note that I adhere to this classification preserving the term adversativity for connectives such as but, however, etc. As will be shown below, however, I take the view that conditionals such as if can also be used rhetorically to mark adversativity and contrast.



It follows, therefore, that for a simple conditional to be interpreted as a concessive one, it must not license this inference.

### 3. Modern Greek connective ‘(e)an’: concessive conditional

With this armoury we can now examine some cases of conditionals and concessives or conditional concessives of MG and compare them with their English counterparts. In this paper I will not particularly assess AA’s claim about the three types of concessive connectives, an extension of Athanasiadou and Dirven’s (1996) classification of conditionals to concessives.<sup>6</sup> A rather side concern in this paper would be with the MG allegedly counterparts of the undifferentiated even if (table 1) expressing factuality in its course-of-eventness sense (CEC) only, hypotheticality (HC) signaling scalarity, and pragmaticity/conversationality (PC) denoting concession. In HC and PC uses even if is not factive according to AA. That even if does not have the prerogative of monopolizing concessivity in English is rather clear to me as it is to other researchers too (cf. Haiman 1974, König 1986, Dancygier 1998). AA’s main point is that the three types of concessive even if have distinct lexical realizations in MG. However, the thesis put forward in AA is that the connectives in the right-most column (table I) are adversative rather than concessive, as is the general view. It is helpful to have a view of the final table in AA (14) displaying the distribution of the English and Greek conjunctions in the three domains and their subtypes:

**Table 2:** Conditional, concessive and adversative settings in English and Greek

Conditionality			Concession			Adversativeness
CE	PC	HC	HC	PC	CEC	
C						
if	if	if	even if	even if	even if	although, though, even though
(e)an	(e)an	(e)an	esto ki an akoma ki an ke na	esto ki an	paroti ke pu	molonoti, ki as

<sup>6</sup> Dirven (1996) also adopts the same tripartite classification for concessive connectives of English.

In what follows I will concentrate on AA's claim that the Greek *if*, that is *(ε)άν/(ε)αν*, does not extend to adversativity or concessivity, but rather unambiguously denotes conditionality, as this is the main concern of the paper. On the basis of real data, I will demonstrate that, not only is this conditional connective used to signal adversativity as well as concession, but is also used in a variety of genres as a rhetorical adversarial structure.

### 3.1. Interrogative contexts: *(E)αν* as a concessive marker

First, I will start with some interrogative contexts in which it has been noticed that the conditional connective *if* is prone to acquire a concessive meaning (Ducrot 1972, Van der Auwera 1986, König 1986). Consider examples (5) and (6):

5. *Θα πάς το πρωί στη δουλειά αν χιονίζει;*  
'Will you go to work tomorrow morning if it is snowing?'
6. *Θα το ξανάκανες αν έτρωγες μια φορά πρόστιμο;*  
'Would you do that again if you were fined (at least) once?'<sup>7</sup>

We see that the simple conditional MG connective *αν* tends to acquire a concessive meaning in the interrogative context and is paraphrasable as (5a), just like its English translational equivalent:

- 5a. *Θα πάς το πρωί στη δουλειά ακόμα κι αν χιονίζει;*  
'Will you go to work tomorrow morning even if it is snowing?'
- 6a. *Θα το ξανάκανες ακόμα κι αν έτρωγες μια φορά πρόστιμο;*  
'Would you do that even if you were fined (at least) once?'

I may utter (5) when it is mutually known to me and the addressee that the road he takes to go to work is one with hairpin bends and skidding is likely in adverse weather conditions. I am not concerned here with an explanation of why *if* or *αν* in interrogative contexts gravitates towards a concessive meaning. My only concern is that indeed MG *αν* can have this

<sup>7</sup> Athanasiadou (at the presentation) objected that in interrogative contexts or in some of my examples *(ε)αν (=if)* is pragmatic and therefore exempted from her statement that *(ε)αν* cannot signify concession or adversativity. But it must be stressed that Athanasiadou (1997) does not exclude any type of *(ε)αν (=if)* in her all-sweeping generalization that the MG paradigmatic conditional connective does not extend to concessivity and adversativity. Moreover, (5) and (6), just like most of my other examples, are quite obviously not conversational or pragmatic cases (PC) of *(ε)αν (=if)* by any account or standards. It is clear that both clauses in (5) and (6) are propositions related at a conceptual level. So *(ε)αν* functions concessively and contrastingly or adversatively, as I will show, at the ideational level. (Cf. also Βελούδης, 1998).

meaning in such contexts and it, thus, appears an equi-valent translational counterpart of if, contrary to AA's claim. I should only note that contextual assumptions seem to play a pivotal role in rendering both if and *αν* concessive in interrogative contexts. But it is also significant that the *q* is not asserted but rather questioned. One of the properties characterizing the concessive type of clauses in (I) is (iii), that is the presupposition or implication that 'if *p*, then normally  $\sim q$ '. This condition is absent in simple conditional clauses, in which the prevalent property is that of 'conditional perfection' or the invited inference that *q* only if *p*.<sup>8</sup> It is also absent in simple conditional clauses in interrogative contexts such as (7):

7. *Αν τελικά έρθετε, θα συνεχίσετε την ερευνητική σας εργασία εδώ;*  
 'If you end up here, will you carry on with your research?'

### 3. 2. Scalarity

Another class of conditional clauses with an that tend to be interpreted concessively are those involving scalarity as in (8):

8. *Αν(ίφ) πεις μια γουλιά κρασί, δεν θα 'ρθώ,*  
 'If you have a sip of wine, I am not coming'  
 which can be paraphrased as (8a):

- 8a. *Και μια γουλιά κρασί να πεις, δεν θα 'ρθώ.*  
 ('And one sip of wine to drink...')

This example conforms with König's (1986) concessive (irrelevance) conditionals in class b of (I), and more specifically, it belongs to (Ib3). Q holds for the most lower value on a scale and hence it holds for all other values higher on this scale. Also compare (9):

9. *Αν(ίφ) ήπιε μια γουλιά κρασί, η γυναίκα του δεν το πρόσεξε.*  
 'If he had a sip of wine, his wife did not notice it'

(9) is paraphrasable as (9a):

- 9a. *Ακόμη κι αν ήπιε μια γουλιά κρασί, η γυναίκα του δεν το πρόσεξε.*  
 'Even if he had a sip of wine, his wife did not notice it'

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<sup>8</sup> For an explanation, see Van der Auwera (1986). The reason why interrogative contexts gravitate towards concessive interpretations is probably that connected propositions of conditionals are usually patterned on supposedly assumed common knowledge (as their entailments, Kitis 1999) and are not therefore likely to be questioned: Are you going to join your husband in N.Y. [his new place of residence] if you don't find a job there?



### 3. 3. (*E*)*αν* and other particles or anaphoric links

Another type of conditional clauses with an *αν* that tends to acquire concessive meaning would be that in which the apodosis contains somehow the protasis either due to a gap or due to an anaphoric link. An optional concessive particle may also appear in such protases.

10. *Δεν ευχήθηκε ποτέ το θάνατό του. Αν όμως (if however) έγινε κάποια φορά θα ήταν τότε που την πήγαν στο νοσοκομείο με κατάγματα στα πλευρά.*

‘She never wished for his death. But if this ever happened it must have been when she was taken to hospital with broken ribs’.

11. *Αν(ίφ) τους είδαν δεν τους μίλησαν.*

‘If they saw them, they didn’t speak to them’.

Interestingly, *ακόμη κι αν* ‘*akomi ki an*’ (even if), the concessive connective, can substitute without any meaning loss or alterations for *αν όμως* ‘*an omos*’ (if nevertheless) in (10) and (11).

### 4. Properties of concessive ‘(e)*αν*’

Resorting to Ταβλε 1, where all the properties of all types of conditional and concessive clauses are clearly displayed, we see that in all these examples characterized by a concessive meaning, there is a total absence of conditional perfection, on one hand, a characteristic of conditionality, while *q* is in all these cases entailed or granted, a characteristic of concessivity (questions exempted). Moreover, there is a presupposition or implicature of type (b,iii) or (c,iii), another property of concessivity (König 1986). That MG (e)*αν* is used concessively is not surprising in view of the function of its counterparts in other languages, but also as the equivalent AG conditional connective *ei(ean)[if]* was also sometimes used with a concessive force (Xenophon, *de re equestri*, l. 17) (Smyth 1920: 2379).

### 5. Modern Greek connective ‘(e)*αν*’: from concession to adversativity

From concession to antithesis the distance does not seem to be great. If we concede to a state of affairs, an event or a fact, we are not thereby precluded from juxtaposing it with another state of affairs as well. Witness (12) (real data):

12. A: *Ξέρεις ποια είμαι εγώ; Είμαι γυναίκα δικηγόρου.*

‘Do you know who I am? I am a lawyer’s wife’

B: *Αν(ίφ) εσύ είσαι γυναίκα δικηγόρου, εγώ είμαι γυναίκα γιατρού.*

‘If you are a lawyer’s wife, I am a doctor’s wife’

In (12B) *av* ‘if’ is a concessive marker introducing a clause (p) that has just been uttered by the previous speaker and is repeated in B’s turn in a conditional construction which has a concessive meaning. Speaker B accepts in her turn that A’s husband is a lawyer, as claimed by her, but she juxtaposes it to another state of affairs, the fact that she is a doctor’s wife. (12B) could be paraphrased as (12a), (12b) or (12c):

12. a. Let’s accept, as you say, that your husband is a lawyer. So what?  
 Mine is a doctor (even higher status!)  
 b. Even if you are a lawyer’s wife, I am a doctor’s wife.  
 c. You may be a lawyer’s wife but I am a doctor’s wife.

In (12B) both the p of the protasis and the q of the apodosis seem to be entailed by the context. This claim is substantiated if we insert the concessive connective *omos* (but, however) in the apodosis. Although Tzartanos notes that an antithetical connective can precede the apodosis in antithetical conditional constructions, he does not mention that it can be precisely this concessive connective *omos* that can often convert a conditional an-clause to a concessive one. Moreover he enumerates the antithetical connectives *ma*, *ala* and *omos*, but it appears that only *omos* has this prerogative, with *ma* and *ala* acting in coordinate structures.<sup>9</sup> This type of *omos* has a direct equivalent in English:

13. If Berners-Lee invented the Internet, I invented spell check.

If (13) is not granted contextually, on account of our world knowledge, however would do the trick:

13a. If Berners-Lee invented the Internet, I, however, invented spell check.

While *ὅμως/omos* –or its translational equivalent in most context however- may be used in concessive contexts, it is not licensed in if-conditional protases that are used rhetorically in an adversarial structure, that is, in contexts where the protasis is not granted: If Al gore invented the Internet I, ?however, invented spell check. Example (14), on the other hand, needs still, the equivalent of *ὅμως/omos* in some other contexts, to convert the conditional protasis into a concessive one:

14. If he is rich, he is still honest,  
 translated into Greek as in (14a):

<sup>9</sup> But cf. *Av o Xitler ekapse tous Ebraious, ma den kanoume to idio me tous Kourδous simera;* ‘An o Xitler ekapse tous Evreous, ma den kanoume to idio me tous Kourdous simera?’ (‘If Hitler incinerated the Jews, **but** don’t we do the same with the Kurds today?’)

14a. (Δεν ξέρω/Δεν μ' ενδιαφέρει) Αν είναι πλούσιος, είναι όμως τίμιος.<sup>10</sup>

The following examples attest to the factual use of *αν*, which, moreover, is used in a contrastive manner to antiparathesize facts or states of affairs or events. *Αν* not only signifies in the realis mode, but both protasis and apodosis of the complex sentence denote factualities. Since it is not used conditionally in any sense, it is used concessively and hence antinomically.

15. *Αν ο Χατζηνικολάου διαθέτει, πέραν των προσόντων του, και την πολύ άνωθεν στήριξη,<sup>11</sup> ο Παύλος Τσίμας έχει το δικό του όπλο που λέγεται Λάκης Λαζόπουλος. (Εξουσία, 19-9-97)*

'If Chatzinikolaou has, on top of his qualifications, a few strings to pull, Pavlos Tsimas has his own weapon which is called Lakis Lazopoulos.'

16. *Αν η επανάσταση της QuickCam είναι μέχρι στιγμής "αόρατη", τα μάτια του Internet δεν θ' αργήσουν να μπουν στη ζωή μας. (Το Βήμα, 29-6-97)*

'If QuickCam's revolution is still "invisible", Internet's eyes won't take long to enter our lives.'

17. *Αν για πολλές άλλες χώρες της ΕΕ το θέμα είναι τεχνοοικονομικό, για μας είναι θέμα επιβίωσης μπροστά στον τουρκικό επεκτατισμό.*

'If this issue is technoeconomic for a number of other EU countries, for us it is an issue of survival vis-à vis Turkish imperialism.'

<sup>10</sup> To the objection that (14a) does not sound so good, I would answer that it sounds as good as (14). However, the factuality and concessivity of its protasis if-proposition is confirmed, not only by *ομως* (nevertheless), but also by the insertion of the conjunctive connective *και* (ke=and) as an additive focus particle in the apodosis as shown in (14b): *Αν είναι πλούσιος, είναι όμως και τίμιος.* (If he is rich, he is still and(=also) honest). Moreover, cf. (14c): *Αν δεν είναι πλούσιος, είναι όμως τίμιος.* (If he is not rich, he is nevertheless honest). (14c) demonstrates that the degree of concessivity depends on the type of the conceptual relation construed or reflected in the complex sentence. It is interesting to note and worthy of further research that *ομως*(still, nevertheless), as well as *και*(and), can be inserted in the apodoses of (e)an-conditional clauses converting them to conditional concessives. Cf. a current billboard ad of ntl company in UK and its translation in MG: (i) *If your home is computer free it doesn't have to be internet free.* (ii) *Αν δεν exete computer sto spiti sas den iparxi loyos na min exete ke(and) internet.* The additive particle *ke* in the apodosis is necessary for the enhancement of the concessive meaning of the protasis.

<sup>11</sup> The speaker alludes to the interview with Mrs. Dimitra Papandreou-Liani secured by Mr. Chatzinikolaou. These examples of if-clauses may be called interpretive (Smith and Smith 1988) or metatextual (Dancygier 1998). However, it is worthy of note that they all license the insertion of the concessive particle *ομως*(however) but not of *τοτε*(then).

In (15) to (17) concessive connectives *av και/an ke* ‘if and’ (even if) can substitute for *av/an* without any significant loss or modification of meaning. Since *av*, just like if, can signal factivity and be a reality marker, temporal and causal connotations are not that far away. *Av* just like if, can have a rather temporal meaning approximating to when/*otan*, as in (18) and (19):

18. Του 'κανε μούτρα, *av τον έβλεπε στο καφενείο*.

‘He pulled a face if/when/every time he saw him in the pub.’

19. Θα εξαγριωθείς *av σου πω τι έπαθα*.

‘You’ll be outraged if/when I tell you what happened to me.’

20. *Av τον παντρεύτηκες και ατύχησες, γιατί πρέπει να κατηγορείς εμένα;*

‘If you married him and have been unhappy, why should you blame it on me?’

21. *Και τέλος, av ακολούθησα τη φωτογραφία, είναι γιατί με ενδιέφερε.*

‘And finally, if I took up photography, it was because I was interested in it.’

(B. Ρασσιάς, at broadcast *Νόστος*, 20-11-99, TV ET3)

In (20) and (21) in particular, we must note the aorist indicative in the protasis, which is used to signal perfectivity. The same holds for (9), (10) and (11). However, while in the latter the apodosis is either negated (9, 11) or in the inferential *tha*+aorist past or past modal (10), in the former (20, 21) the apodosis either presupposes the protasis as in (20) (in which it forms a felicity condition) or it is an explanation of it as in (21).

## 5. Conditional clauses as rhetorical antinomial constructions

It is rather obvious that in the majority of the examples of the above section (4) the conditional *an* is used in a rhetorical construction acting as an exponent of antinomial states. I have claimed in recent work that temporal connectives are used as rhetorical constructions of contrast (Kitis forthcoming[a], Koutoupi-Kitis 2001). I would like to argue that, very much in the same vein, conditional constructions are frequently put to work in a like manner, but Tzartanos (1989:70) has ‘caught up with’ me. He writes:

«Πολλοί υποθετικοί λόγοι δεν είναι τίποτ’ άλλο παρά απλοί **ρητορικοί τρόποι έκφράσεως**, ήτοι πολλές φορές χρησιμοποιείται υποθετικός λόγος όχι για να τεθεί μια υπόθεση κι’ απ’ αυτή να εξαχθεί ένα συμπέρασμα, αλλά για να εκφραστεί κάποιο διανόημα ζωηρότερα και παραστατικότερα.»

“Many conditional statements are little more than simple **rhetorical modes of expression**; that is, we often use a conditional statement, not because we want to make a supposition that will lead to a conclusion, but because we want to express a thought more vividly.”<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Smyth (1920) on vivid conditionals in AG.

Clearly, *αν* is not a conditional connective in the traditional sense in some of the examples examined here, as it does not introduce a hypothesis or a condition, but rather is used to ‘grant’, or concede, the proposition of the protasis as a fact beyond any doubt. The role of the concessive character of the protasis is to enhance the force of the apodosis. Its function is rhetorical and strategic rather than anything else. It can be used in a contrastive manner, as we have seen and as Tzartzanos notes:

«...[Σ]ε έναν υποθετικό λόγο μπορεί με την υπόθεσή του να εκφράζεται παραστατικότερα... ισχυρή αντίθεση προς το περιεχόμενο της αποδόσεως. Τότε στην απόδοση μπορεί να προτάσσεται και ένας απ’ τους αντιθετικούς συνδέσμους *μα, αλλά, όμως*: ‘Αν ήταν η Παντάνασσα πρωτοτάξιδη, εμείς ήμασταν παλιοί θαλασσομάχοι.» (:70)

“...the protasis of a conditional statement may express more vividly a strong contrast to the content of the apodosis. In this case it is possible for the apodosis to be preceded by a contrastive connective *μα, ala, omos(=but)* ‘If this was Pantanass’s maiden voyage, we were seasoned seafarers’.”

However, the strong contrast is not the only reason for using this type of construction; neither is it always due to the factual character of the protasis or the apodosis as the following examples witness:

22. *Αν εσύ είσαι έξυπνος, εγώ τότε είμαι Αϊνστάϊν.*

‘If you ‘re intelligent, then I’m Einstein.’

23. *Αν τον είδες εσύ, τον είδα κι εγώ.*

‘If you saw him, I saw him too.’ (stress indicated)

24. “Αν ο Μπυφόν έγραψε ένα μεγαλειώδες έργο, επιχειρώντας να καταγράψει σε ένα βιβλίο το σύνολο της ζωολογίας, δεν μπορεί άραγε να υπάρξει ένα παρόμοιο έργο με αντικείμενο την κοινωνία;” Η φράση ανήκει στον Μπαλζάκ και συνοψίζει το σχέδιο της *Ανθρώπινης Κωμωδίας*...

“‘If Buffon wrote a grand work, trying to record in a single book the complete field of zoology, can there not be a similar work (one might ask) in the field of sociology as well?’ This statement belongs to Balzac and it adumbrates the outline of *Human Comedy*...”

Example (22) is an instance of an indicative counterfactual. It is noteworthy that the substitution of *όμως/omos(=but, however, still)*, the concessive particle, for *τότε/tote* ‘then’ in the apodosis only (not in the protasis) of (22), will convert the protasic proposition into a concessive one. The proposition of the protasis in (22) is not an uncontroversial proposition accepted by the speaker as in the other cases we have seen; rather it is a context proposition (Akatsuka 1986, Kay 1997), to which however the speaker is not (or need not be) committed. (24) is not

contrastive in any sense but the protasis is used rhetorically as a grounding mechanism for the following discourse. The factuality of the protasis in (24) is not sanctioned by history only (Buffon 1777) but also by its participial clause.

The conditional construction is naturally used as a major premise in a syllogism and as such it is abundantly used in political discourse. But its factuality often depends on expediency:

25. ...αν αυτό ισχύει στις πόλεις και ισχύει\_πολύ έντονα ...hh είναι εντονότατο στην επαρχιακή Ελλάδα ... Κι αυτό πρέπει να σας πω ότι το 'χω ζήσει ...hh επειδή έχω κινηθεί πά:ρα πολύ ...

‘...if this is the case in the cities and it is the case and very much so ...hh it is very evident that it is so in provincial Greece .... And (this) I must tell you that I have experienced it ... because I have been around quite a lot’.

(Κ. Καραμανλής, party leader)

## 6. MG concessive connectives reviewed

In this section I will briefly review AA’s proposed distinction between concessivity and adversativity with a view to challenging the tripartite classification suggested within the former domain for the MG connectives into HC, PC and CEC (an extension of Athanasiadou and Dirven’s, 1996, typology of conditionals, Table 2). However, my main objective is to examine the classification of MG connectives rather than the conceptual domains and distinctions proposed. Moreover, AA’s discussion is limited to specific examples rather than being theoretically substantial.

The writer argues that in CEC concessives the two propositions denote “real events” which “presuppose the factual character of even if which here can be substituted with [sic] although” (AA: 7). But if although can substitute for even if in some CEC cases, so can any of the MG connectives which she categorizes as adversative (*molonoti*, *ki as*, and many others that are omitted in her discussion and final table). On the other hand, *παρότι/paroti*, *μολονότι/molonoti* (: 12) and *και που/ke pu* are interchangeable in concessive and adversative contexts, probably because a distinction on the grounds drawn in AA is not viable. Moreover, these allegedly adversative only connectives, as well as the whole gamut (all subtypes) of concessives, can fit the bill in what –as shown in (26)- in what AA calls conversational concessives categorized as PC (pragmatic) under concession (Table 2), while according to her only *esto ki an* is admitted to this class:

26. Even if/though you’re not hungry, there’s food in the fridge.



depending on the factuality assumed in the protasic proposition. Moreover, even group A connectives need not signal their speaker's lack of knowledge as to their addressee's state of hunger, for as Akatsuka (1986) noted with respect to if-clauses, a conditional clause, rather than a causal one, is likely to be used if a contextually given *p* represents newly learned information rather than the speaker's own knowledge.

It is more than clear that (26i, ii) are all instances of pragmatic conditionals (PC) according to AA, and equally clear that not only her distinction between the two broad domains of concession and adversativity is untenable, but also her tripartite distinction of the concessive domain is equally indefensible.

AA's main reason for distinguishing between concessives and adversatives is that in the latter (though, even though, although) "there is no relation of causal or suppositional dependency between the main clause and the subclause", and she speaks of an "intrinsic contrast" (AA: 10). However, it is not very clear what exactly she means when she talks about it and concludes that "Adversative settings, then, are used when speakers want to explain a deliberate and intrinsic contrast to the situation described in the main clause. While in concession the contrast may be affected and not hold [sic], in adversativeness, because of the intrinsic basis for contrast, it is always factually true" (AA: 10).

While I can't see what is offered towards a better understanding of this class of connectives other than labeling König's (1986) concessives as 'adversatives', as regards the MG connectives, which is our focus here, we can conclude that indeed they deserve a thorough examination before one makes judgements as to their admissibility to conceptual domains and improvised classes. Besides, when AA claims that in although, though and even though (her class of adversative connectives) there is no "conditional link because there cannot be any relation of dependency between the antecedent and the consequent, [t]here is only an adversative link" (13), she ignores all implicational meanings and disregards that there is a conventional conditional presupposed or implicated between the protasic proposition and the negation of the apodosis (König 1986, Kay 1991). This implied conditional link, called "paradoxicality" (Yamaguchi 1989) (common in both concessive conditionals and concessives [AA's adversatives]) is the springboard for comprehending adversativeness and contrast (Kitis 2000, forthcoming[a]).

Moreover, the main concessive connective *av και*/*an ke*, lit. if and 'although', (Tzartzanos 1989, Sidiropoulou 1990, Karantzola 1995, Holton et al. 1997, Kortmann 1997), which, interestingly enough, is directly related morphologically to the prototypical MG connective *an*, is not



discussed or mentioned, neither does it appear in AA's final table.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, AA seems to be rather oblivious to the verb forms accompanying concessive connectives in antecedent protases. Her thesis that *esto ki an* is a concessive connective used in PC (pragmatic) and HC (hypothetical conditionals) contexts only to mark hypotheticality or unreality collapses once the same hypothetical concessive conditionals are coupled with different verb forms:

27. *Esto ki an tin eðerne, afti ton latreve.*  
 'Even if he beat her, she adored him'.

But one might object that (27) is no longer a hypothetical conditional (HC) but rather a CEC one (course-of-event) (it can't be pragmatic or conversational (PC)); but if this is so, then *esto ki an* should appear in the relevant class in AA's table and would then vitiate her claim about the distinguishability of MG concessive connectives.<sup>16</sup>

There is also a host of infelicities in her treatment of even the English connectives; for example, with regard to although she fails to acknowledge the well attested thesis that its proposition is entailed or presupposed (R. Lakoff 1971, Halliday and Hasan 1976, Koutoupis-Kitis 1982) and tries to account for infelicitous sentences such as (28) in terms of a lack of "intrinsic contrast":

28. i. ?Although he goes away, I will stay  
 ii. ? Although you are not hungry, there is food in the fridge.

Apart from the answer to her problem entailed above in (26i), which would dissolve AA's concept of the lack of "intrinsic contrast", a mere replacement of verb forms would have the same result.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Smyth (1920: 2369) as regards AG: "Concessive clauses are commonly formed by *και* [(ke=and)] in conjunction with the *εἰ* [if] or *εάν* [if] of conditional clauses: *καί εἰ* (*κεῖ*), *καί εἴαν* (*κάν*) even if, *εἰ καί*, *εάν καί* although". Smyth (:2370) continues: "Such concessive clauses are conditional, but indicate that the condition which they introduce may be granted without destroying the conclusion. The apodosis of concessive clauses thus has an adversative meaning, i.e. it states what is regarded as true notwithstanding (...*ὁμῶς*) what is assumed" (my emphasis).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Tzartanos (paragr. 253) for interchangeability of *κι ας*/*ki as* and *ιέστω κι αν*/*esto ki an*, adversative and concessive respectively, in AA's terms.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Although he goes to church every Sunday, his wife stays at home to prepare the meal. The answer to AA's puzzle can be sought in Vendler (1967) or Mourelatos (1981). Space does not allow discussion. Similar infelicities attach to her judgement of implausibility of perfectly acceptable uses of sentences such as Even if I knew him, I did not recognize him; cf. Dancygier's (1998) examples: *If I have met him, I didn't recognize him* (27), *If I ever read this book, I have forgotten it altogether* (: 111).

29. Although he's going away / he left, I will stay.

Further, the indeterminacy of the factuality of even if is attributed to polysemy carrying along in its sway the MG connectives (AA: 12). All in all what is in essence involved in her discussion of both the English connectives as well as the MG ones is the notion of entailment, which is glossed over. Yet this notion is well attested in discussions of connectives. So is the notion of context-proposition (Haiman 1974, Akatsuka 1986, Kay 1997).<sup>18</sup>

I think I have said enough to support the point that, while the Greek language affords a plethora of concessive connectives, one cannot, indeed should not, lightheartedly differentiate amongst them on such flimsy grounds and criteria as those offered in AA, especially if one does not make use of attested conceptual tools.

## 7. Concluding

The prototypical conditional connective of MG *an* has been examined here with a view to demonstrating that, contrary to arguments advanced relating to its pure conditional meaning, its meaning and function extend beyond conditionality to domains such as concessivity and adversativity. Concessive connectives of MG regarded in AA as falling within delimited categories have also been reviewed and shown to have been so categorized on untenable grounds and criteria. The key notions within the spectrum of epistemic stance (Fillmore, 1990) that are detrimentally missing in AA's account are 'context-proposition' (which does not require the speaker's commitment), as a property assigned to even if clauses, as well as 'entailment' characterizing although-, even though- and though-clauses. These properties of protasis propositions are pivotal for a serious discussion of the nature of MG concessive connectives, as are implicated, implicit or presupposed conditional statements in the use of concessive and adversative statements in general (Kay 1991, Kitis forthcoming[a]). Moreover, I believe to have provided evidence that AA's account cannot seriously challenge current categorizations such as König's (1986).

It follows therefore that any further claims relating to the nature of the Greek culture on account of the allegedly (un)conditional purity of *an* and the categorization of concessive connectives of MG into distinct subtypes

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<sup>18</sup> Cf. AA's battling with various impressionistic notions "negotiation or permissiveness or even indifference" (12) when the well attested pragmatic notion of 'context-proposition' would have solved her problem even if added little to our understanding of connectives.

of concessivity and adversativity are, to say the least, unfortunate.<sup>19</sup> I have further claimed that on account of its meaning extension to realms of concessivity and adversativity, an(*if*), just like other connectives, affords the potential for its rhetorical use in a variety of genres. Indeed, there are some rhetorical uses of conditional structures a perspicuous account of which can be given only in terms of constructions (Kay 1991, Kitis forthcoming[b]).

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<sup>19</sup> One can note that in MG participial clauses or gerunds have various readings ranging from temporal to causal and modal depending on the conceptual relations between the two clauses each time. This is impossible in English where distinct connectives will each time translate those gerunds. Also connectives like *afu* can be both temporal and causal, but in English this connective will be variously translated as *after* or *since*. However, it is clearly unwise to base judgements about the ambiguity of cultures on such issues.

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