

Chapter 16

From motion to emotion to interpersonal function. The case of fear predicates

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*All that emotion is, in many circumstances,
is a particular form of communication.
(Parkinson 1995: 170)*

1. Introduction*

The connection between feeling and thought, emotion¹ and cognition, has been noticed and widely discussed in the literature. In philosophy this connection seems to have been well established for a very long time. According to Aristotle's *Poetics* (19 'Thought'), under 'thought' fall all the effects that have to be deliberately and consciously achieved through the use of speech. Elements of this endeavor are (1) proof and refutation and (2) the stimulation of feelings such as pity, fear, anger, and the like. On the other hand, Hume (1962: 77) writes:

It seems a proposition which will not admit of much dispute that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to *think* of anything which we have not antecedently *felt*, either by our external or internal senses.

Hume almost puts his finger on the imprint of the scars but misses the deeper source of thinking, that of concrete perception and expression. But he does trace ideas, that is thinking, to impressions, that is feeling. In this study, I will provide linguistic evidence that points to the priority of external behavioural

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1 For a discussion on the distinction between emotion and feeling, see Wierzbicka (1999).

1 aspects of presumed emotion that lead through their perception and interpreta-
 2 tion to the attribution of cognitive aspects of emotion. Such behavioural as-
 3 pects are metonymically connected to assumed emotional states, which in their
 4 turn are metonymically used in social situations at an interpersonal level func-
 5 tioning as mitigation devices, amongst other uses, or, more generally, serving
 a variety of social functions at a presumed expressive rather than propositional
 level of communication. I will demonstrate this route of semantic evolution by
 examining two emotion verbs in two languages, English and Greek.

10 I will focus on the Greek psych-verb *fovame* and its translational equivalents
fear/be afraid.² I will claim firstly that, not only mental verbs in the broad
 sense, but also the special class of psych-verbs can be shown to contribute to
 the class of speech act verbs. Secondly, additionally to Vendler's (1972) claim
 that there is close affinity between mental and, in particular, thought verbs and
 speech act verbs, I will show that the category of psychological verbs, or the
 15 domain of emotions, has been a source for the development of propositional
 attitude and speech act verbs, and interpersonal meanings. Moreover, contrary
 to Vendler's claim that there is a two way leakage between speech act verbs
 and mental verbs, I will show, by tracing back the diachronic evolution of both
fovame and *fear/be afraid*, that the leakage goes in one direction only, from
 20 emotions to propositional attitude and speech acts, and not the other way round
 or both ways. At a crosslinguistic level, this study is intended to add further
 evidence to Traugott's (1989) thesis that this directionality, from emotions to
 performativity and interpersonal meaning, is consistent with a universal ten-
 dency in language to move from propositional meanings via expressivity to
 interpersonal ones, since emotions are represented in propositional form while
 25 performativity involves propositional attitude and interpersonal meanings.
 It will also emerge from an examination of the origins of both *fear* verbs that
 their source domain is spatial rather than emotional. In both the cases of *fovame*
 and *fear/be afraid* there has been a shift from concrete spatial source domains
 30 to the more abstract domain of emotions. Our diachronic itinerary is expected
 to partially explain the syntactic patterns into which *fovame* enters. Therefore,
 let us first concentrate on the Modern Greek (MG) predicate *fovame*.

35 2 Let it be noted that I regard as translational counterparts those terms which occur
 more frequently or readily as their translational equivalents and which appear first
 in dictionaries: *fear* = *fovos*, *tromos*, etc.; *afraid* = *fovismenos*, etc., *be afraid* =
 38 *fovame* (Penguin-Hellenews English-Greek Dictionary, 1975); *fovos* = fear, fright,
 dread, anxiety; *fovume* = be afraid, be fearful, be/stand in fear of, etc. (Stavropou-
 39 los, 1988, Oxford Greek-English Learner's Dictionary, OUP). There are two mor-
 40 phological versions of the predicate: *fovame* and *fovume*, the latter being closer to
 its Ancient Greek equivalent form.

2. The case of *fovame*

The following examples illustrate the main constructions of the predicate *fovame* in MG.

- (1) *Fovate ala apokalipti.*
is afraid-3SG but reveal-3SG
'He is afraid/scared but reveals.' (newspaper title)
- (2) *Pjios fovate ton Lenin?*
Who is afraid-3SG the-ACC-SG Lenin?
'Who' s afraid of Lenin?' (newspaper title)
- (3) *Fovame neo ktipima.*
Am afraid/fear-1SG new blow
'I fear a new blow.' (newspaper title)
- (4) *Fenonte na mi fovunte tus paparatsi*
seem-3PL to not be afraid-3PL the-ACC-PL paparazzi
'They seem not to be afraid of the paparazzi.'
- (5) *Fovame na su po perisotera.*
Am afraid-1SG to you tell more
'I'm afraid to tell you more.'
- (6) *Foviθike apo ton sismo.*
Was afraid-3SG of/from the-ACC earthquake.
'He got frightened/scared by/of/at the earthquake.'
- (7) *Foviθike pu o filostu piastike.*
Was afraid-3SG that the friend his was arrested-3SG
'He was afraid/frightened when his friend was arrested.'
- (8) *Fovame oti den θα pliroθume.*
Am afraid-1SG that not will(partcl.) be paid-1PL
'I'm afraid that we won't be paid.'
- (9) *Fovame oti/pos den mporo na apokalipso*
Am afraid-1SG that not can to reveal-1SG
to onoma.
the-ACC name
'I'm afraid that I can't reveal the name.'
- (10) *Fovame min/mipostapotihokšana.*
Fear-1SG that(lest) fail-1SG again.
'I'm afraid/fear that I might fail again.'
- (11) *Fovame mu ine adinato na ti*
Am afraid-1SG me-GEN is-3SG impossible to it
dehto.
accept-1SG

- 1 'I'm afraid I can't accept it (an application).'
- 2 (12) *Mu ine adinato na ti .Dehto,*
- 3 Me is-3SG impossible to it accept-1SG,
- poli fovame.*
- 5 very much am afraid.
- 'I can't accept it, I'm afraid.'
- (13) A: *Θα 'ρθis sto parti?*
- will(partcl.) come-2SG to the party?
- 'Will you come to the party?'
- 10 B: *Fovame (pos) ohi.*
- am afraid-1SG (that) no.
- 'I'm afraid no.'

15 As can be seen the syntactic pattern of the predicate *fovame* is quite wide ranging. *Fovame* as an one-place predicate admits its experiencer in subject position in the structure *NP V*, as in *I Maria fovate* 'Maria is afraid' or in (1). As a two-place predicate it can take an internal argument in the accusative *NP V NP*, as in (2), (3) and (4), or in a prepositional phrase (PP) expressing cause, as in (6). Moreover, it admits an *oti* 'that'-complement, as in (8) and (9), or a *min/mipos* 'that/lest'-one as in (10), as well as a factive *pu* 'that'-complement, as in (7). It also admits a *na* 'to'-clause, as in (5) (cf. Kakouriotis and Kitis 1999; Theodoropoulou 2003).

25 Vendler (1972) wanted to prove that the semantic organization of verbs of "speech and thought" is very similar. In what follows, I will demonstrate that his claim can be extended by showing that the semantic organization of verbs of "speech and emotions" is very similar, too.

30 2.1. The evolution of *fovame*

35 First, I will try to substantiate the claim that there is only one direction in Vendler's leakage, that from the source domain of space and motion to the target domain of emotions. Tracing back the history of *fovame* or *fovume*, which is a middle formation, we see that it originates from the Ancient Greek (AG) transitive predicate (it checks objective case) *foveo* [*phobēō*]³ which means 'put to flight' as in the following examples from Homer's *Iliad*:

- 38 3 *phobēō*; aor. (e)*phobēsa*; mid. pres. part. *phobeumenos*; fut. *phobēsomai*; pass. aor.
- 39 3 pl. (e)*phobēthen*; perf. part. *pephobēmenos*; plup. 3 pl. *pephobēato*: act., 'put to
- 40 flight', *tina* (=one)-3 sl.; mid. and pass., 'flee, be put to flight', *hupo tinos* or *hupo tini*

- 1 (14) *tous d' allous Danaous **ephobêse** Kroniôn.* (Il. 11, 2.36)
 2 'the rest of the Danaans hath the son of Cronos **scattered in flight**'
 3 (15) *hos te kai alkimon andra **phobei*** (Il. 16, 2.36)
 'for he [Zeus] **driveth** even a valiant man **in rout**'
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In both (14) and (15) the predicate selects a nominal in object accusative: *tous ...allous Danaous, alkimon andra*.

The Passive and Middle *phobomai* [*phobeomai*] in Homer denoted a bodily activity and was always used in the sense of 'to be put to flight', 'flee in terror':

- 10 (16) *mega men kakon ai ke **phêbômai** plêthun tarbêsas* (Il. 11, 2.71)
 '[then what is to befall me?] Great evil were it if **I flee** seized with fear of the throng'
 (17) *tophra d' Achaioi taphrôi kai skolopessin eniplêxantes oruktêi entha kai entha **phebonto*** (Il. 15, 2.48)
 15 'meanwhile the Achaeans were flinging themselves into the digged trench and against the palisade, **fleeing** this and that way'
 (18) *opisô de pulas lipe, bê de **phobêtheis***: (Il. 22, 1.93)
 'but left the gates behind him, and **fled in fear**'
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From this meaning of motion away from one point (due to imminent danger or compulsion) there develops the meaning of the emotion of fear as we know it now, as in (19), in which the motion (fleeing) is denoted separately (*ôichonto*) (but see also (18)):

- 25 (19) ***phobêthentes** hoi xenoî ôichonto* (Aeschines 1.43)
 '**having been frightened**, the strangers fled'

And in Thucydides we encounter the transitive verb meaning 'terrify' checking an object accusative (*autous*) as in (20), and (*Alkibiadên*) as in (21), which is also interestingly followed by a telic complement clause (*mê . . epagôntai*).

- 30 (20) *su de, Klearida, husteron, hotan eme horais êdê proskeimenon kai kata to eikos **phobounta** autous, tous meta seautou tous t' Amphipolitas.* (Th. 2.79)
 35

(=by one); tina. Transliteration key for AG (different from that for MG, the first sign is in AG, the second in transliteration, if a third, it is for pronunciation): ô/b=v. φ/ph=f, ω/ô=o (long), η/ê=i (long), v=u, θ/th=th (as in 'thing'), γ=g, δ=d, ξ=x, ψ=ps, χ=ch, as in Perseus. Breathings are not reflected. Underlining in examples reflects exact lexical correspondences. Bold indicates corresponding fear predicates.

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1 ‘and do you, Clearidas, afterwards, when you see me already upon
2 them, and, as is likely, **terrifying** them, take with you the Amphipoli-
3 tans’

- (21) *Alkibiadên ephoboun, mê kai,... tauta legôsin, epagagôntai to plêthos.*
(Th. 5.45)

‘[they] **frightened** Alcibiades lest, if they were to say these, there would be a crowd’

10 Middle morphology is apparently motivated by dethematizing the agent, a process common to both reflexive and middle formations, as noticed by Abraham (1995). The poetic use of the passive form of *phobêd*, *phobomai* [*phobeomai*] is used only in early texts with the passive meaning of ‘being put to flight’. While in the *Iliad* the transitive predicate with its motion or spatial meaning of ‘put to flight’ is very common, soon this form gives way to its middle formation as the agent gets dethematized and the semantic focus shifts on emotion aspects of meaning, that is, as the experiencer or affected becomes the focus of the discourse, as in the following example from Herodotus. The focus is on the barbarians as the experiencers and the theme of the discourse, but one can still detect the spatial meaning of the past participle *pephobêmenoi* (signifying that they were pushed into this small space) on top of the emotion meaning of fear.

- 15 (22) *hoi de barbaroi ... aluktazon te hoia en oligôi chôrôi pephobêmenoi*
(Herod. 9.70.1)

20 ‘but the barbarians ... in distress in such a small space **were pushed** terrified’

25 So the middle formation of *fovame* seems to be predicted by Iwata (1995). As observed in there, “psych-verbs behave like ordinary verbs in several respects when the notions of external argument and direct internal argument are crucially involved. First, middle formation is generally taken to suppress the external argument and externalize the direct internal argument” (96). So we see that the meaning of *fovame* originates from the meaning of its transitive form denoting the spatial source domain of motion and it only later shifts to the domain of emotions: *terrify*, *alarm*, as in the following middle examples from Thucydides:

- 30 (23) *pantôn te ephobounto malista tous Lakedaimonious, hoti echontas ti ischuron autous enomizon ouketi sphisin epikêrueuesthai* (Th. 2.68)

35 ‘out of all, however, **they feared** the Lacedaemonians most, as they must, it was thought [by the Athenians], feel themselves on strong ground not to send them any more envoys’

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1 (24) *phoboumenos de mê hoi pempomenoi ... ou ta onta apangellôsin*
 2 (Th. 2.10)

3 'Fearing, however, that the messengers ... might not report the truth'

5 It is interesting to note the transitive form of the verb in (20) blending both meanings denoting motion and emotion, while the middle formations in both (23) and (24) present a distinct evolution from emotional aspects of meaning to cognitive ones. The (quasi-) complementizers in both cases (23: *hoti echontas*, etc. -in fact a relative-causal clause-; 24: *mê... apangellôsin*) attest to this meaning development. Both structures are reflected in MG, the former by examples such as (2), (3) and (4) selecting object nominals that can also be followed by *oti* 'that'-clauses or causal ones, the latter by examples such as (10).

10 In later texts this semantic evolution of the predicate is stabilized. In (25) the predicate is constructed with an infinitival complement (*phanai*) marking a move to cognitive meanings signifying emotion (in some cases) but often doxastic views:

15 (25) *egô men gar phoboumai sophistas phanai.* (Plato, *Sophist* 3.52)
 20 'for I fear/hesitate to declare (them) sophists'

25 In (25) the emotion meaning of *phoboumai*, gives way to cognitive doxastic meanings and the verb functions as a mental or cognitive verb, rather than just an emotion one, signifying attitude towards the proposition of its complement clause. This structure is reflected in MG examples like (5).

30 However, even though in MG this predicate never denotes motion or bodily movement, vestiges of this motion meaning in AG use are to be found in some of its current constructions. The middle predicate *phoboumai* in AG can check a prepositional phrase (PP) *apo tinos* 'to be afraid of one', just as in MG. According to L&S this co-occurrence is probably a Hebraism. In MG *apo* is encountered primarily (if not only) with the past perfective of *fovume*, *fovithika*, but Tzartanos mentions expressions such as *fovate apo ta skilia* 's/he's afraid of dogs', and Thoedoropoulou (2003: 268) notes features such as [+specificity] and [-animacy] in this respect. Whatever the case may be, MG *fovume* in its past perfective form can be followed by the preposition *apo* 'by/from' signifying the cause of fear as in (6), repeated here:

38 (6) *Fovithike apo ton sismo.*
 39 Was scared-3SG of/from the-ACC earthquake.
 40 'He got frightened/scared by/of/at the earthquake.'

1 Followed by *apo*-PP, MG *fovume* always signifies emotion only, and, as this
 2 construction occurs overwhelmingly in the past perfective (*foviθika*, perfectives
 3 typically signify events rather than states), we can mark it as a structure remi-
 4 niscient of the initial motion or spatial meaning of the AG (Homeric) predicate.
 5 Moreover, the past perfective signifies characteristics, [+specificity], [+factivity],
 consonant with those of action predicates such as the AG *phobeô/phouboumai* de-
 6 noting bodily movement, while tracing the etymology and semantic evolution of
 the preposition *apo* ‘from’ will witness a similar route to that of *phouboumai*, i.e.
 7 its evolution from concrete spatial domains, signifying movement from a point,
 8 to abstract domains of causality (cf. Fraser 1987; Kitis forthcoming).

9 Its etymology as a verb signifying action (motion) also seems to be impli-
 10 cated in the use of the imperative form or subjunctive forms in directive speech
 acts in later texts:

- 15 (26) *ton phobon autôn mê phobêthête* (New Testament, Ep.Pet. 3.14)
 ‘do not **keep away** from/because of their fear’
 (27) *Phobou tous Danaous kai dôra pherontes* (moto)
 ‘**keep away** from the Danaans even if they are bearing presents’

20 It is interesting to note that in (26) the predicate checks its cognate noun *phobon*
 in accusative form in object nominal position. The action meaning of the verb
 rather than its emotion one is implicated in imperative forms of the predicate,
 as you cannot ‘impere’ emotions but you can direct actions. In this case, the
 verb can admit a person accusative signifying person and can mean ‘stand in
 25 awe of’, ‘dread’:

- (28) *phobou tous anô theous* (Plato)
 ‘**dread/stand in awe of** the gods above’

30 Indeed, the New Testament is bristling with injunctions featuring this predicate
 in the sense of ‘revere’ and ‘stand in awe’, not to be found in its MG version.

35 As AG *phouboumai* is de-semanticized as an action verb and re-semanticized
 as an emotion one, it soon comes to admit (quasi) complement clauses with an
ho ti ‘that’ complementizer. In fact, these clauses are relative-causal, further
 38 elaborating the cause of fear always articulated in an object accusative nominal
 in internal thematic position. This development marks the predicate’s acquired
 39 potential to act as a cognitive verb, not so much expressing feelings or emo-
 40 tion, but as expressing (unwelcome) views. This further parallel development is
 exemplified in (29); in other instances, it directly admits a *mê[n]* ‘lest’-clause,
 without an internal thematic nominal, as exemplified in (24) or (30). This struc-

ture is very common in both early and later AG texts, as well as in the *New Testament*:

(29) *phoboumai tode, ho ti...*(Th. 7.67).

'I fear this, that...'

(30) *kai hoi Athēnaioi, ... phoboumenoi mê sphisi dica gignomenois rhaion machōntai*, (Th. 2.10).

'and the Athenians, **fearing** lest they get divided and so fighting at a disadvantage.'

Goodwin (1889) notes that complements of verbs of *fearing*, selecting *mê* or *hopôs mê* followed by the present subjunctive, refer to a future object of fear, and "may also denote what may hereafter *prove to be* an object of fear." (II. [17]§ 92). This structure is reflected in MG examples such as (10) and, even though the verb expresses the emotion of fear, its function is not very dissimilar to that of cognitive verbs. What must be noted is that structures of the predicate admitting *directly* an *hoti* complement (as in MG example [9]) is a much later development as this structure does not occur in the *New Testament* either. In later texts, there is the occasional occurrence but then *hoti* introduces a causal clause, often after a comma, as in (31) from Xenophon:

(31) *ho de Armenios... kai to megiston, ephobeito, hoti ophthêsesthai emelle ta basileia oikodomein archomenos* (Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, 3.1.1)

'but the Armenian [king] ...**was afraid** most of all because (that) he saw that he was sure to be seen in the act of beginning to build his palace.'

But (31) does not feature the verb in first person singular, a structure promoting the doxastic (propositional attitude) aspect of meaning. Such structures were not found in AG texts, including Lycias' and Isocrates' texts (expected to have more rhetorical structures). As will be claimed further below, it is this structure that in MG has evolved to function as a 'regret' speech act verb at an interpersonal level.

3. The case of *fear*

In this section, we will briefly examine the translational equivalent predicates in English, *fear* and *afraid*. Extending our diachronic approach to them, we

shall find that the basic configuration of their semantics owes a great deal to their etymology and the evolutionary aspects of their development.

Let us first turn to the verb *fear*. As a noun, O(ld) S(axon) *fâr* meant ‘ambush’, ‘stratagem’, and ‘danger’. The OS verb *fârôn* meant ‘to lie in wait’, and in O(ld) H(igh) G(erman) *fârên* meant ‘to plot against’ (OED). *Fear*, just like the AG *phobeo*, originally is an active verb with an object as patient. The OE verb *f#ran* meant ‘to terrify’, ‘to take by surprise’. It has a transitive use admitting an object in internal thematic position. (32) is from the very early text of Middle English *Ormulum*:

(32) *He wîle himm færenn.* (Ormin 675, c 1200)

‘He will frighten him (drive him away)’

(33) *His hunttes to chace he commaunde,/ Here Bugles boldely for to blowe,/ To fere the beestis in þat launde.* (*The Sowdone of Babylone* 57–59, c 1400).

‘He commanded his hunters to chase, and blow their horns strong and far to frighten (drive) away the beasts in that land’.

But also much later (functioning as an interjection in this context):

(34) “*Where’s Miss Kitty... or gone to see somebody’s child with the measles, devil fear her! She has plenty on her hands to do anywhere but at home...*” (Father’s angry talk about his daughter, Miss Kitty) (Charles J. Lever *Lord. Kilgobbin* xviii, 1872).

Just like AG *phobeo*, that means ‘to put to flight’, *fear* also meant ‘to drive away by fear’, ‘to frighten away’, especially birds or animals (OED):

(35) *Eddres to sleyn and foules oute to fere is.* (*Palladius on Husbandrie* 1.147, c 1420).

‘it is to destroy adders and to put to flight fowl’

(36) *O Thou good ihesu, ... fight strongly for me, & fere away the euyll bestes, that is to say my lecherous concupysseus, that I am moued & tempted by...* (Atkynson tr. *De Imitatione* III.xxvii, 1504)

‘Oh, Good Jesus, ... fight strongly for me and drive away the evil beasts, that is to say my lecherous carnal desire, that I’m moved and tempted by...’

(37) *A scar-crow ...to feare the Birds of prey.* (Shakesp. *Measure for M.* II.i.2, 1602) (OED).

‘A scare-crow to frighten away the birds of prey’

It also meant 'to deter from a course of conduct or action' or to 'to drive by fear' (OED):

(38) *Eueriche busshope...sholde...Feden hem [hus peple]... and fere hem fro synne.* (Langland *P.Pl.C.* xviii, 1393)

'Every bishop should nourish them [his people] and stop them from sinning (keep them away from sin)'

(39) *And it should somewhat touche them to be sene by werynes of pryson to feare him to it.* (Foxe *Acts & Monuments* 788a, 1563).

'And they should be concerned if they were to be seen that wariness of prison would drive him (the bishop) to it' (to give an answer for fear of imprisonment)

From these two motion and locative meanings, signifying bodily movement ('to put to flight', 'to frighten', 'to drive away by fear') evolved the meaning of emotion of both these verbs.

It is interesting to note that, while in Greek a morphological Middle develops from *phobeō*, *phouboumai*, in English we witness the form *fear* developing into a reflexive form, meaning 'to feel fear', 'to regard with fear', 'to be afraid': (Both agentive *fear* and *phobeō* eventually become obsolete). The construction develops from the expletive structure witnessed in (40) to reflexive structures (*I fear me*) such as in (41) (42), expressing propositional attitude alongside the emotion of fear:

(40) *I, now symple and moost rude...It fereth me sore for to endyte;/ But at auenture I wyll now wryte* (Stephen Hawes *The Example of Vertu* 8–14, 1503)

'I, now humble and most ignorant ... I very much fear to compose; But I will now venture to write ...'

(41) *I feared me always that it wolde be so.* (Palsgr. 547/2, 1530).

'I was afraid that it would be so'

(42) *I fear me ...some... earthly love mingles with his friendship* (R.A. Vaughan *Mystics* I.167, 1856) (OED).

'I fear that some earthly (coarse, material) love interferes with his friendship'

If we accept Meyer-Lee's (2007: 180) commentary on this stanza of the lines in (40), as framing the poet's self-derogation in seeking to position himself as a poet in the context of his predecessors, then it is likely that '*It fereth me sore*' expresses propositional attitude rather than any emotion of fear. Furthermore, we notice the structure's development to first person singular

present uses (*I fear me*) as in (42) – compare with (41) – a structure used to register propositional attitude and perform speech acts. Subsequent uses as a parenthetical, and indeed in medial position, is an unsurprising development, as in (43):

- (43) *A flash, I fear me, that will strike my blossom dead.* (Tennyson *Lancelot & Elaine* 966, 1859) (OED).

What emerges from the examination of both these verbs (*phobeô*, *fear*) is that they have followed parallel routes in their evolutionary semantics and morpho-syntactic patterns. It appears, however, that whereas in the synchronic use *fear* seems to be more dynamic, projecting into the future (with *afraid* taking over in more stative aspects of the emotion of fear -generic statements are expressed with *afraid*), the Greek *fovame* is both stative and dynamic according to its context and its aspectual properties. (cf. Kakouriotis and Kitis 1999; Tissari 2007).

Afraid is the past participle of *affray*, meaning ‘alarmed from a previous state of peace’, *affraien* ‘to attack’, ‘invade a country’. (From Old French *esfreer*, ‘to disturb’, from Vulgar Latin *exfredare*, ‘to break the peace’, from *ex-*, ‘out’, ‘away’, AHD), while later it acquires the meaning of fear as in (45):

- (44) *þe Kyng was alle affraied.* (R. Brunne *Chron.* 16, 1330) (OED).
‘the king was wholly alarmed’
- (45) *Moses couered his face, for he was afrayed to loke vpon God.* (Coverdale *Ex.* iii. 6, 1535) (OED).

As it was used frequently in its participial form, this predicate soon acquired an independent status (16th c) (OED). Therefore, its stative fear meaning is accountable on the grounds of both its morphology (being a past participle) and its original meaning (locative). This predicate soon came to be used to express more subjective discourse-meanings. Tissari’s findings attest to a ‘I suspect’, ‘I regret to say’ use of the predicate in 1501, earlier than the analogous one recorded in OED. In the next section, we will see how subjective meanings of the emotion are due to processes of metonymization. These processes are also at work in pushing *fear* predicates to function further in the social domain of interpersonal transaction. We will see how initially observation or evidence of external behaviour is used to infer subjective meanings which ultimately are capitalized upon to perform specific speech acts.

4. Processes of metonymization

Metonymy is a pervasive linguistic, conceptual and processual phenomenon (Gibbs 1999), enforced by instincts of economizing on resources, but it also marks the whole representational system of a language, since even writing is metonymic originating from drawing. An eye metonymically represents omniscient and omnipresent God, the drawing of the eye itself metonymizes God and all the qualities attributed to God, the concrete element of the physical domain standing for, or invoking, the abstract non-physical qualities. As Foucault (2002/1966: 122) writes:

And it is by following the nervure laid down by these figures [synecdoche, metonymy, catachresis] that those languages paralleled with a symbolic form of writing will be able to evolve. They become endowed, little by little, with poetic powers; their primary nominations become the starting-points for long metaphors; these metaphors become progressively more complicated, and are soon so far from their points of origin that it is difficult to recall them. This is how superstitions arise whereby people believe that the sun is a crocodile, or that God is a great eye keeping watch on the world; it is also how esoteric forms of knowledge arise among those (the priests) who pass on the metaphors to their successors from generation to generation; and it is how allegorical discourse (so frequent in the most ancient literatures) comes into being, as well as the illusion that knowledge consists in understanding resemblances.

It is reasonable to assume that in the case at issue the fear meaning, as a later development, was inferred and arrived at on the basis of the external demonstrable behaviour, especially as inner psychological states are abstract and inaccessible. We are not concerned here with the debated issue of whether emotions are caused by their symptoms or vice versa. (cf. Damasio 2003), but we can assume that the verb denoting the external behaviour was metonymically used later to also attribute the presumed psychological state to the experiencer until it eventually came to denote it. The behaviour of fleeing away from something (cf. Kövecses 1990; Wierzbicka 1990, 1999 on the specification of *fear*), or being disturbed or alarmed from a previous peaceful state is endemic in corresponding psychological states or vice versa. We need not claim that there is a cause effect relationship, but we can assume that reference to the initial bodily action also at some later stage came to implicate the existence of the psychological state, probably initially conversationally and later this implicature was conventionalized (Grice 1989). In other words, reference to the concrete behaviour can serve as a bridge to the emotional state, and this bridge is what we call metonymy. Kövecses (2002: 148) explains the function of metonymy quite succinctly:

The main function of metonymy seems to be to provide *mental, cognitive access* to a target entity that is less readily or easily available; typically, a more concrete or salient vehicle entity is used to give or gain access to a more abstract or less salient target entity within the same domain.

Moreover, the metonymic relation in the case of the *fear* verbs examined here is that of contiguity as the bodily action is ordinarily considered a symptom of the caused (and causing) psychological state.

So, as regards the derivation of the semantic organization of the predicates *fovume, fear* and *afraid*, we see the following schema being in full force:

<i>Source Domain</i>	<i>Target Domain</i>
(concrete, spatial) motion	(abstract) emotion

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Figure 1. The semantic evolution of fear predicates from motion to emotion

5. The evolution of interpersonal meaning

It must be clear by now, that both *fear* verbs examined here have followed similar trajectories from the meaning of bodily activity (from motion), which is obsolete in both cases, to the meaning of emotion. However, as we have already seen, this trajectory has spanned further into the discursive space of social interaction, and the semantics of these predicates has extended further: these predicates (*fovume, fear, be afraid*) have been shown to shift from more semantically-based space to more pragmatic functions determined by discursive needs.

Both the Greek *fovume* and its translational counterparts exhibit a high degree of variation in position within the clause. Already in its reflexive form *fear* occurs interclausally as a parenthetical as in (43), and later, shedding the reflexive form, as below:

- (46) *The account ...will hardly, I fear, render my letters very interesting.*
(F.A. Kemble *Resid. in Georgia* 16, 1863) (OED).

However, this function seems to have been very largely taken over by the predicate *be afraid* for English, as it has become current since the 16th century. (Cf. Kakouriotis and Kitis 1999; Tissari 2007)

On the other hand, as AG *phoboumai* acquires the meaning of fear-emotion and its constructional schema mutates into a middle formation, as we have seen, it admits an internal argument in the accusative often followed by an *hoti* relative-causal clause elaborating on the object of fear, as in (23). It is this

structure that later is assumed to give rise to the predicate's selecting directly an *oti* 'that'-clause as in (31)⁴, which occurs at an early stage. Both *fovume* and *fear/be afraid* drop their complementizers at some stage and gradually acquire potential for free movement within the formerly complement clause, which is naturally elevated to the status of the main clause as in (11), (12) and (43).

Thus, both *fovume* and *fear/be afraid*, having already undergone a process of desemanticization as we have seen, can be used as modalizers (11), highlighting the speaker's attitude towards what s/he is saying as well as to couch negative predictive speech acts, as in (9) and (10). In this respect they seem to have followed a similar route as that of cognitive verbs such as *think*.

It is evident that there is a very small step from this state to the state of performativity. If a condition for speech acting is a certain state of mind, we can assume, by extending this condition, that a certain psychological state of mind is a prerequisite for a speech act verb, which eventually may acquire performative status. And this constitutes a kind of metonymy (cf. Kakouriotis and Kitis 1999).⁵ Naturally, the emotion is perfunctorily assumed rather than existing, and socially motivated. We may recall Austin's (1962) comments in this respect:

There are numerous cases in human life where the feeling of a certain 'emotion' (save the word!) or 'wish' or the adoption of an attitude is conventionally considered an appropriate or fitting response or reaction to a certain state of affairs, including the performance by someone of a certain act, cases where such a response is natural (or we should like to think so!). In such cases it is, of course, possible and usual actually to feel the emotion or wish in question; and since our emotions or wishes are not readily detectable by others, it is common to wish to inform others that we have them. Understandably, though for slightly different and perhaps less estimable reasons in different cases, it becomes *se rigueur* to 'express' these feelings if we have them, and further even to express them when they are felt fitting, regardless of whether we really feel anything at all which we are reporting. (78–79).

Indeed, the name for the emotional condition might evolve into the name for the speech act; and in the case of both the Greek *fovume* and the English *be afraid*, they are both used to perform negatively viewed predictive speech acts as we have seen. The *fear* verb can act as a *sine qua non* mitigating device of

4 This is not absolutely correct, as, the verb *ephobeito* in fact checks *to megiston* as a direct internal object even if the latter functions as a quantifying adverb: 'he feared a great deal'. I have in fact not found an instance of the verb directly selecting an *hoti* 'that' complement in my AG corpus. This construction appears to be a later development.

5 For a similar argumentation in respect of indirect speech acts, see Panther and Thornburg (1998), and Thornburg and Panther (1997).

the illocutionary force, as shown in the following news item: “Upon hearing that his son suffered from Hahira syndrome, a rare neurological disorder which would cause him ‘very serious difficulties’, David Cameron asked a pediatrician: ‘Does that mean he’s going to have trouble doing his maths, or does that mean he’s never going to be able to walk and talk?’ The doctor replied: ‘I’m afraid it means he probably won’t walk or talk.’” (*The Mail*, 11.03.07)

Further, in (11), *fovume* functions as a performative as its speaker uses the predicate, not so much to mitigate the force of the rejection (a socially motivated tendency) but to ‘seal’ the speech act as a rejection, etc., depending on the context. Indeed, often a *fear* construction (*fovume* or *be afraid*) “as a performative, ... expresses speaker’s appropriation of authority as an actor attempting to match world to word.” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 209). The following text from a cartoon, underlines the point:

- A: Let’s get down to it, Mr. Duke. I’ll pay you \$10,000 a week to represent Berzerkistan!
 B: I’m afraid we’d need \$50,000, Excellency.
 A: I wasn’t negotiating. And don’t push it-I have a very long reach!
 (from *Doonesbury*, Garry Trudeau, *The Guardian* 18.10.07)
 ‘I’m afraid’ in B’s utterance turns it into a clear negotiatory move couching a rejection, hence A’s reply.

Therefore, *fear* verbs are prime examples of what Traugott (1989) has shown to be a well attested process in language, i.e. cases of shift from propositional (‘to flee’, ‘to unsettle’) to expressive meanings (emotions) to interpersonal ones (propositional attitude verbs, speech act hedges, speech acts, modalizers and parentheticals), as shown in the diagram below:




Figure 2. The evolution of fear predicates from semantic to pragmatic domains (adapted from Traugott 1989)

While spatial and emotion meanings are propositional and conceptual, performatives, parentheticals and modalizers have a procedural function. As Traugott and Dasher (2002: 209) write, “[r]ecruiting a verb designating a certain kind of locution (itself ultimately derived from an originally spatial lexeme) to performative use involves recruiting it from the domain of content semantics to

function also as a procedural indexing the kind of discourse being engaged in. Recruiting this verb ...to the class of epistemic parentheticals involves recruiting it to a primarily procedural class.” As has often been shown in the literature, this process engages both the semantic and the pragmatic domains as it is a discourse-based evolutionary process, but as meaning evolution proceeds from the former domain to the latter, we can witness a transition from more objective domains to more subjective ones (Kitis 2006; Pishwa 2006a; Traugott 2003; Traugott and Dasher 2002; Verhagen 2005).⁶ However, it must be stressed that, while the *fear* predicates examined here have developed a concurrent procedural pragmatic function, in both languages they also retain their semantic content of emotion and are the main predicates for expressing the corresponding emotions.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, in this study we have witnessed a course of parallel shifts in the meanings of the *fear* verbs examined here. The signification of action was metonymically used to indicate, or as the name of, the emotion, gradually giving up its place in the semantic domain of meaning. So, we can safely assume that in both cases there has been a shift of meaning from the concrete source domain of motion and locality to the target domain of emotions. In the case of these verbs the source domain is currently inactive but its traces are felt in current uses of the verbs discussed.

We have also witnessed a further shift from the domain of emotions to the domain of propositional attitude meaning; in this case, the domain of emotions has been used as a source domain. Both *fovume* and *fear* (originally, and *afraid* later) joined the course of propositional attitude verbs very early in their evolution. Having dropped the need for the complementizer at some stage, they

6 For a not very dissimilar account of these processes, see Tissari (2007). She bases her account of the subjectification of the propositional meaning of *fear* verbs on Fauconnier and Turner's (2000) notion of compression, and on politeness principles. She also offers a comprehensive corpus-based account of the semantic evolution of the *fear* verbs. However, my account differs from hers in viewing the direction of the process: while she thinks that “[f]ear in the chain stands first for a suggestion of danger, then for evidence of danger, then for knowledge of danger, and lastly for the hearer/reader's reaction”, this study adopts a rather phenomenological approach that guides interpretations to proceed from outer demonstrable behaviour to inner inaccessible emotional states. These states are then in their turn capitalized upon at a perfunctory semiological level in performing certain social speech acts.

1 gradually exhibited potential for free movement within the clause.⁷ They are
 2 currently used (alongside their propositional uses) also as parentheticals pro-
 3 moting their embedded clauses to the status of the main.

5 We acknowledge that it is often extremely difficult to tell whether we have
 a performative use of a verb; and we also acknowledge that both *afraid* and
fovume are currently used to introduce (rather than perform) speech acts. How-
 ever, they both have the meaning of ‘regret’ and seem to be well on their way
 towards becoming full-fledged performatives as some of their uses indicate.
 Moreover, if *regret* is a performative verb, so be it for ‘regret’ uses of the predi-
 10 cates. It also appears that we need to take a more constructional view of speech
 acts and performativity that would take on board contextual features contrib-
 uting to interpretations (Cf. Stefanowitsch 2003). Evidence for their perfor-
 mativity acquiring status is also afforded by the fact that an external negative
 operator with scope over these predicates is not licensed by such uses of the
 15 predicates either in Greek or English: **I’m not afraid I can’t help you*. Neither
 can such uses be reported as emotion uses: **He was afraid he couldn’t help
 her*.

20 Moreover, we have provided evidence that supports Traugott’s (1989) hy-
 pothesis that propositional meanings give rise to interpersonal ones and not
 vice versa. This evidence does not support Vendler’s claims that there is a
 bidirectional leakage between thought and speech, and consequently between
 mental verbs and speech act verbs. “This shows once more”, as Traugott and
 Dasher (1987: 571) would say, “that there are powerful regularities in semantic
 change of a far more specific sort than the ‘extension of meaning, metaphoric
 25 shift, metonymic shift, amelioration’ or ‘pejoration’ we hear so much about in
 earlier treatments of semantic change.”

30 Moreover, we believe that we have provided evidence that extends Traugott
 and Dasher’s (1987) claim that “as far as lexicalization of metalinguistic reper-
 toires is concerned, [not only] ‘having in mind’ seems to be more fundamental
 than ‘asserting that’” (571), but also ‘having the emotion’ has been proven to
 be very essential, too. Our evidence supports Traugott and Dasher’s (1987)
 claim that thought (and we would add ‘emotion’ too) and speech “are not the
 same thing as the metacognitive and metalinguistic terms that lexicalize them”
 (572). Besides, *fear* is a native term, and this constitutes further evidence for
 the postulated anteriority and priority of the emotion over its articulation as a
 35 performative or parenthetical verb. The relation, indeed, is not mutually con-
 stitutive.

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 40 7 That does not mean, of course, that the *that*-complementizer uses are not synchronic
 uses in both languages.

In short, the discussion has demonstrated that the semantic evolution of the *fear* verbs examined in this study evidences a configuration of cognitive meanings that is put in the service of social demands. Indeed, sociality is cognitively configured. But then established social norms shape and reinforce cognitive structures to an extent that they reach the status of being regarded as collective cognition, probably of a different caliber. This type of social cognition is often blaringly missing in autistic conversational behaviour, and more particularly in Asperger's syndrome (extensive personal knowledge), which is characterized by social impairment in the relevant literature. While neurotypical individuals can handle the interpersonal procedural function of *fear* predicates efficiently in their conversational transactions, Asperger patients can only use them as emotion predicates (semantic meaning) but not in their interpersonal pragmatic function as mitigating devices, etc. This evidence may indicate that semantic bleaching of expressions attributing to them a procedural function may implicate procedural strategies of social cognition stored separately from semantic and episodic memory (cf. Pishwa 2006b).

7. Implications for psychological accounts of emotions

Appreciation of linguistic aspects of the evolution of emotions from experiential domains to the interpersonal domain of communication will further corroborate psychological accounts that view emotions as social constructs played out in the real world, i.e., as having communicative function, rather than merely as internal states (Parkinson 1995). In particular, an account of the development of *fear* predicates in the terms analyzed here might further inform interpersonal accounts of emotion vis-à-vis intrapsychic appraisal theories of emotions in psychology. According to the latter, emotion needs to be first encoded as a private meaning before it can enter the interpersonal world, as a type of translation of inner states.

Moreover, my account of the history of the two predicates points to a dynamic 'on-line' construction of the emotion of fear rather than to a static, pre-formed cognitive schema, or internal script that is waiting to be activated by some external or other eventuality (Wierzbicka 1990, 1994; Kitis forthcoming, for criticism).

On the other hand, interpersonal accounts of emotions in the field of psychology need to take into account findings of linguistic research in the field, which may balance their claim that emotion is primarily interpersonal.

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