Connectives and frame theory
The case of hypotextual antinomial 'and'

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In this study I examine some uses of connectives, and in particular co-ordinate conjunction, from a critical discourse perspective; these uses, in my view, cannot find a satisfactory explanation within current frameworks. It is suggested that we need to identify a conceptual level at which connectives function as hypo-textual signals, activating systematic law-like conditional statements (IF-THEN), which form default specifications of consistent structured knowledge frames. I argue that an account of connectives at the conceptual level of their function that does not take into consideration such tightly structured background schemata, representing both general knowledge and ideologies, cannot afford any generality. As a result, 'deviant' or 'subversive' uses of these connectives can neither be identified as such nor find an adequately general explication within existing accounts, whereas in the proposed framework such uses find a ready explanation of sufficient generality. This framework lies at the intersection of disciplines: Linguistic pragmatics (empirical pragmatics, critical discourse analysis), on the one hand, and cognitive science, on the other. Consequently, this proposal, too, can be regarded as a plea for crossing boundaries and joining forces.

> *Without signs, there is no ideology*
> Vološinov

1. Introduction

In this paper I would like to address the problem of connectives, and, in particular, co-ordinate conjunction, from the perspective of critical discourse

analysis, which in my view can inform explanatory theoretical accounts. Connectives have been predominantly considered to be empty words or accessory words or pseudo-words, or to function as conjoining meanings or syntagms. As a result, they form a class that has been rather neglected in a critical linguistic analysis despite the immense recent attention connectives and discourse markers have received in the literature. My objective will be to demonstrate that frame theory is needed as a constraint on the interpretation of connectives. It will be argued that the fact that this constraint is not (always) consciously appealed to in producing interpretations does not render it inoperative, even if less conspicuous. Moreover, it will be argued that it is precisely the presence of these constraints that provides connectives with a potential for rhetorical use. We will concentrate on cases of *and*-conjunction in which the postulation of frames has to be consciously accessed as a constraint yielding acceptable interpretations.[1]

Before focusing on some conceptual or ideational uses of (primarily) *and*, however, I would first like to trace back very briefly the main concerns related to connectives, as the interest has primarily emerged from philosophical quarters. This brief itinerary will not only highlight the preoccupation with truth-functionality as the logical meaning of connectives, but also juxtapose the function of connectives as stance-operators discussed here with earlier and current accounts. In Sections 2, 3 and 4, I will present some uses of co-ordinate conjunction which I will call 'hypotextual' (2 and 3) because connectives are both constrained and interpreted on the basis of hypotextual premises, either activated or constructed. These functions of connectives can be identified as ideological (Section 2), emotive (Section 3), or ideology-constructing (Section 4). In all these functions connectives act mostly as rhetorical devices. In Section 5, I will briefly discuss a widely current account in order to show the need for the adoption of frame-theory as an active constraint on the function of connectives (Sections 6 and 7). In Section 8 I will argue that my perspective affords greater explanatory power than other accounts. In Section 9 I address problems engendered by a localized use of *but*, and accommodate it within the overall perspective proposed here, while in Section 10 I integrate my proposal within a broader perspective on connectives. In the conclusion, I will offer a reappraisal, as customary.

1.1. *Conjunction in logic*

Conjunctions or σύνδεσμοι, as they were traditionally called, were defined by Aristotle as *φωναί ἄσημαι,* i.e., 'voices with no meaning'. They have been called 'accessory words' (Harris 1771), 'syncategorematic' terms, 'empty words', 'pseudo-words' (Ullmann 1957), 'form-words' (Ullmann 1977), etc., apparently because they were considered to be insignificant in terms of their contribution to meaning in general, which was thought to be minimal if not null.

Dionysius Thrax, who distinguished eight word classes, described the class of conjunctions as follows:

> σύνδεσμός ἐστι λέξις συνδέουσα μετὰ τάξεως καὶ τῆς ἑρμηνείας
> κεχηνός πληροῦσα
> *syndesmos* (conjunction): is a part of speech binding together the discourse
> and filling gaps in its interpretation (Robins 1967: 43).

The venerable position occupied by connectives within truth-conditional semantics originated from linguistic philosophy. Russell (1973 [1940]: 38) writes:

> The most complete part of logic is the theory of conjunctions. These, as they occur in logic, come only between whole sentences; they give rise to molecular sentences, of which the atoms are separated by the conjunctions. This part of the subject is so fully worked out that we need waste no time on it.

This philosophical tradition, nevertheless, placed later research on connectives in a certain perspective. Preoccupation with truth-conditionality set up a paradigm that proved decisive for the lines of research that were to follow within the framework of ordinary language philosophy and within semantics and linguistics in general. There has been a consistent effort until quite recently to account for the meaning of conjunction within model-theoretic semantics, although the unease for such an enterprise was felt quite early. Strawson (1952: 81), for example, writes:

> The fact is that, in general, in ordinary speech and writing, clauses and sentences do not contribute to the truth-conditions of things said by the use of sentences and paragraphs in which they occur, in any such simple way as that pictured by the truth-tables for the binary connectives ('⊃', '.', '∨', '≡') of the system, but in far more subtle, various, and complex ways.

More specifically, with regard to *but* and other connectives, he adds: "The words 'but', 'although', 'nevertheless', for example, are not mere stylistic variants on 'and'". Haack (1978), amongst many others, discusses the further problem of why *and,* but not *but* or *because,* has an analogue in logic.

1.2. *Connectives in semantics and pragmatics*

Within this climate and in an effort to salvage truth-conditional semantics — a point that is not always appreciated in the literature — Grice propounded his theory of the logic of conversation; he claims that any extra-logical aspects of meaning of the connectives in natural language are either conventionally or conversationally implicated. For example, *p but q* conventionally implicates that there is a contrast between *p* and *q*. So, when one utters (1)

> (1)   She is poor but she is honest.

what is implied is (very roughly) that there is some contrast between poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and her honesty (Grice 1967: 90).

As I pointed out in the past (Koutoupis-Kitis 1982), there is a remarkable difference between the two options, i.e., between saying that the contrast holds between the specific proposition *p* and *q*, and between poverty and honesty *in general*. Claiming the latter is tantamount to saying that the contrast, even if between *p* and *q*, is generalizable as an enthymeme that relies on an activated universal law-like premise: *If one is poor then one is not honest* or *Poor people are not honest*. Such universal statements need not be activated in order to support an interpretation of (1) in the former case, when the contrast is said to hold between *her* poverty and *her* honesty locally. For in this case, the contrast can be isolated and restricted to the two conjoined propositions *p* (*her* being poor) and *q* (*her* being honest) relative to a certain goal of the discourse at issue rather than to each other (see Section 9). Grice does not seem to be aware of this discrepancy and its consequences, and he glosses over this important issue. As regards *therefore*, he writes:

> If I say (smugly) "He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave", I have certainly committed myself by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its being the case that his being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an Englishman (Grice 1975: 44).

The idea of course was that conventional implicature, which is said to be invariant and determinate, though excluded from the truth functional meaning

of the sentence, can be said to form part of its conventional meaning. In this case, too, the speaker does not appear — in Grice's program — to invoke any general assumptions or background beliefs by using the specific linguistic item. Instead, the speaker implicates a causal relation between the propositions of the two sentences. Grice's account, thus, does not acknowledge any generalizations underpinning contrastive or causal *in situ* relations between the propositions in a conjunction. From that point of view one might say that in Grice's account the speaker appears to be unconstrained in his/her use of these connectives.[2]

The line of thought inaugurated by Grice was followed by various researchers in the field. The notion of *implicature* provided shelter, and still does, for many diverse linguistic, and sometimes non-linguistic, phenomena. However, as interest was shifting from the propositional level to the level of discourse, researchers noticed various functions of connectives that could not be accounted for within the propositional paradigm. van Dijk (1979), for example, identified their function as speech act organizers. Kitis (1987a) and Schiffrin (1987) identified and amply demonstrated, respectively, the function of connectives as discourse organizers or *discourse markers,* as Schiffrin calls them, although this function was initially pointed out by van Dijk (1979), if not by Sacks et al. (1974). Koutoupis-Kitis (1982) proposed an argumentation framework (quite independently of Ducrot and his associates) in accounting for connectives, and specifically for *but*, as interpretation instructors ('metalinguistic orienting signals') introducing distinct moves within the discourse relative to a pre-set goal.

I take the view that connectives function at various levels of language use (Kitis 1987a). These levels have been identified and abundantly discussed and exemplified by Schiffrin (1987). More specifically, there are at least three levels at which connectives may be examined as having differential functions: The propositional or ideational level, at which connectives can have conceptual import in the form of configuring certain relations between the clauses they conjoin, for example causal relations. Another level is the interpersonal one, at which connectives can be used to negotiate the conversationalists' interrelationships,[3] while a further level would be that of the organizational structure of conversation. Naturally all these levels are interconnected in discourse, and connectives may operate at more than one level each time. Moreover, I think that it is often the case, as I have already demonstrated (Kitis 1996, 2000, forthcoming [a]), that functions of connectives at one

level derive from their (concurrent or previous) functions at other levels, very much in accord with Traugott's (1989) thesis.[4] This last point, high-lighting an account of connectives within the framework of grammatical-ization, might go some way towards supplying a tentative answer to Bach's (1999) question regarding the differential function of connectives at one level up, while they are still semantically coordinate with the semantic content of the sentence.

In what follows, I will concentrate only on conceptual uses of connec-tives at the propositional or ideational level, particularly on some evaluative uses. While there has been recently considerable work on various classes of linguistic items as involvement triggers and evaluative devices (Caffi and Janney 1994), connectives have not in general been considered to have such potential.

2.   Connectives acting as ideology configurators: hypotextual function

Grice's program was almost the first substantive shift from an examination of language at the level of the sentence to that of the 'augmented' utterance and talk-exchange. As I observed in 1982, Grice's notion of particularized conversational implicature usually demands bigger chunks of language than the sentence, or at least two-turn exchange structures. His perspective, to be sure, provided solutions to pressing problems at the time. But it prevented an account of linguistic phenomena couched in terms of social conditions, since it stressed cooperation and rationality principles, thus firmly rendering the speaking subject an emotionally unaffected individual. Besides, Grice's all-encompassing notion of implicature resulted in the trivialization of the concept in my view (Kitis 1982), in addition to diverting attention from social and ideological issues.

Connectives have been traditionally viewed as connecting propositions, sentences, clauses or utterances — i.e., as connecting linguistic items, expressions, or whole chunks of speech or language. They have also been viewed as coding circumstantial relations (Matthiessen and Thompson 1988) or cohesive relations (Halliday and Hasan 1976), or as organizing speech acts (van Dijk 1979).[5] However, they have not been seen as interacting beyond the textual or discursive relations, within a broader frame. Connec-tives have not been seen as linguistic items interacting with more or less

systematic chunks of background knowledge, or as items activating, producing or reproducing, constructing or reconstructing belief-systems or ideological schemata.[6]

What is ideology? The answer varies within a wide gamut of views, but for the purposes of this study we can adopt a rather simplified view: Whatever general assumptions we regard as 'common sense'. After all, the more commonsensical ideology is the more dominant, pervasive, and unnoticed: "The ideologies embedded in discursive practices are most effective when they become naturalized and achieve the status of 'common sense'" (Fairclough 1992: 87). I will return to this issue and its interrelationship with frames in Section 6.

In Kitis (1982, 1987a) I identified some uses of 'connectors' that activate background knowledge, beliefs and ideologies, but I did not elaborate the point then. I now want to claim that connectives in some of their functions derive their conceptual import from ideological schemata. The latter are not idiosyncratic to the particular speech event, but are rather stable, constructible and reconstructible on the basis of the enunciation of the connective. Connectives can orient towards items of structured background knowledge, as the latter primarily exists prior to the moment of the enunciation or speech event. Viewing connectives in this light will enable us to give a more general and consistent account of their function.

The connective *but,* for instance, can be used, either intentionally or unintentionally, to configure or forge certain ideological attitudes. I, for one, grew up in an environment where something like (2)

(2)   He is a communist[7] but he is a nice man.

was the order of the day; no wonder why, at the age of sixteen, I felt so perplexed when my first boyfriend (a red revolutionary at the time) toppled this order by issuing statements like (3)

(3)   a.   He is a communist; therefore, he is a nice man.
         or
         b.   He is a right-winger but he is a nice man.

I think to offer an account of the function of *but* in terms of contrasts or expectations related merely to the individual instance of the speech event as nonce speaker meaning or as one-off implicatures would be to trivialize ideological issues of paramount importance. In the vast majority of cases,

specific ideologies (as well as attempts to subvert them as in (3)) can be activated by connectives. In other words, one can present or construct a different 'reality' if one were to utter "He is a communist but he is a nice man" from that constructed by saying "He is a communist; therefore, he is a nice man". Fairclough (1992: 87), concurring with Thompson (1984), would say that ideologies are significations or constructions of reality inscribed into the forms and meanings of discursive practices.

However, I do not claim that ideologies are part of the meaning or function of connectives. What I wish to emphasize is the connective's potential for activating such ideologies or, more generally, stereotypical knowledge, that is either intended to be communicated or to buttress what is communicated. Such stereotypic knowledge acts as the hypotextual premises on which these uses of connectives draw to derive their import, as will be claimed below.

Examples of this function of connectives abound in everyday speech and in every type of discourse. And even highly professional speakers, like Margaret Thatcher, can be conned, even if momentarily, into such ideological gambits. Consider the following excerpt from an interview between Margaret Thatcher and Michael Charlton, quoted in Fairclough (1989: 172–175):

> MC: but this has meant something called Thatcherism now
>   is that a description you accept as something quite
>   distinct from traditional conservatism in this country
> MT: no it is traditional conservatism
> MC: but it's radical and populist and *therefore* not
>   conservative
> MT: it is radical because at the time when I took over we needed to be
>   radical e: it is populist I wouldn't call it populist I would say that
>   many of the things which I've said strike a chord in the hearts of
>   ordinary people…
>   (p. 175 my emphasis)

Notice how Charlton's use of *therefore* introduces a purportedly well attested ideological schema, which can be stated in the form of a conditional, i.e., in the form of many hypothetical quasi-law statements. M. Thatcher, who apparently shares the same ideological frame topography (see Section 7), does not balk at the invocation of this schema, called up by the use of *therefore*. Instead, she tries to redefine the premises.

3.   Connectives acting as emotive devices: hypotextual function

A specific function of the connective *and* (identified and discussed in Kitis 1995) has not, to my knowledge, received satisfactory treatment in the literature. By selecting this particular connective, the speaker may on occasion convey an attitude towards his/her utterance, or may register an emotional stance towards it. *And*, in this function, projects into other discourses or belief-schemata, which we might want to call the *hypo-text* of the utterance. This *hypo-textual* function of the connective is not different from the one discussed in Section 2, since that one, too, invokes or constructs ideological schemata, which form the hypo-text of the utterance. However, in its emotive use it is used rhetorically.

Halliday and Hasan (1976: 252) identify an adversative use of *and*, which can well be replaced in this use by *but*. Their example is:

> Dear, dear! How queer everything is today! And yesterday things went on just as usual.

Schiffrin (1987: 128), on the other hand, identifies two roles of *and* in talk. She writes: "it coordinates idea units and it continues a speaker's action". *And* does not ordinarily appear in the literature within the class of adversative or contrastive connectives or discourse markers (Fraser 1998; Rudolph 1996). However, consider the following sentences:

(4)   His friends are waiting for him and he is on the phone.

(5)   Costas likes it and you're saying that you don't like it.

(6)   Costas likes it and you don't.

(7)   Your friends are coming and you're going to the bath.

(8)   Your friends are coming but you're going to the bath.

(9)   He is in hospital and she is hanging around with friends.

(10)   He is in hospital but she is hanging around with friends.

To (4) my son reacted with (11):

(11)   And why should you care?

whereas to (6) he responded with (12):

(12)   So what? Do I have to like it because Costas does?
[talking about a pizza]

These responses show that in both cases the connective *and* does much more than conjoin the two clauses. In (4) it reveals the speaker's discomfort at, or disapproval of, the situation; hence the son's reaction to it. In (5) and (6) *and* serves to register a contrast between the two clauses within a frame that is not deemed acceptable by the speaker. The hidden premise is that it cannot be the case that in matters of good cuisine Costas is wrong, since he is considered to be the culinary expert in the family and everybody else has to follow suit. Naturally, it is expected that a contrastive function will be borne out by the prototypical or paradigmatic conjunction of contrast in the examples considered here. Let us, therefore, substitute *but*, the contrastive conjunction *par excellence*, for *and* in (4) as it appears in (13):

> [Speaker is referring to and looking at hearer's dad]

(13)   His friends are waiting for him but he is on the phone.

The contrast between the two clauses in (13), I think, is derived from the denial of the expectation that the meeting will soon take place, the second clause being identified as a reason for the delay of the meeting. For example, a reasonable gloss would go like this:

(14)   His friends are waiting for him but he won't be able to come/go because he is on the phone.

But, indeed, can function as a shorthand for *because* (cf. Kitis 1982). We see that, although *but* is the contrastive connective *par excellence*, in some cases, like (4)–(7) and (9), when the speaker wants to register his or her critical stance towards the situation depicted in the conjoined propositions, s/he resorts to the use of *and* rather than *but*. Consider (5) and its variants above, with *but* replacing *and* as in (15)–(17):

(15)   Costas likes it but you're saying that you don't like it.

(16)   Costas likes it but you don't.

(17)   Costas likes it. You don't.

I think that *but* in (16) serves purely as a logical conjunction and it hardly generates any conventional implicatures of contrast, as Grice would have it, since the contrast between the two is realized in the negation of the same predicate predicated of another individual. This is made clear in example (17). Glosses with the prototypical concessive conjunction will not fare any better, as can be seen below:

(16i)   Although Costas likes it, you don't like it.

(9i)   Although he is in hospital, she is hanging around with friends.

We have to explain how some form of contrast, or, primarily, the speaker's critical attitude is perceived in the use of *and* but not in the use of *but* or *although*, which are, respectively, the contrastive and the concessive conjunctions *par excellence.* I propose to view this function of *and* as contrastive or antinomial, rather than concessive (König 1985). I further suggest viewing this antinomy as lying in the breach of a conditional that forms a *default specification* of a consistent frame of background knowledge or belief system, as will be explained in Section 7.

What seems clear is that this type of the use of *and* is evaluative too, since the speaker's involvement invests his or her utterance with value judgements, that are interpretable in terms of a hypo-text constructed by this very use of *and.* Moreover, it is emotive precisely because it generates self-evaluation, i.e., evaluation of the conjunction itself. Provisionally, then, we can assume that *and* functions as a rhetorical device to project emotive attitudes.

4.   Connectives as logical pointers: ideology constructors

Connectives form part of our logical vocabulary in that they are associated in our mind with fixed meanings; we tend to apply this knowledge of their logical meanings quite often 'unthoughtfully' and uncritically, when they appear in a syllogism or an argument (or pseudo-argument). As a consequence, we may be lured into accepting the argument without much thought about its premises and the validity of its conclusion. What I have in mind are deductive, abductive, or inductive inferences framed in the formulaic language of the logical operators:

if p then q   if p then q
and p   and q
therefore/so q   therefore/so p

I call them *logical dummies* or *pointers* in this function because they do not really do any job other than to orient us towards viewing or hearing what is said as an argument and quite often as a persuasive one. Connectives have very often this function in the media and in the language of advertising. But

a nice example is provided by Shakespeare when he lightly quibbles upon the word 'light' in *Love's Labour's Lost:*

> KATHARINE: …And so may you, for a light heart lives long.
> ROSALINE: What's your dark meaning, mouse, of this light word?
> KATHARINE: A light condition in a beauty dark.
> ROSALINE: We need more light to find your meaning out.
> KATHARINE: You'll mar the light by taking it in snuff;
>   *Therefore* I'll darkly end the argument.
> ROSALINE: Look what you do', you do it still i' th' dark.
> KATHARINE: So do not you; for you are a light wench.
> ROSALINE: Indeed, I weigh not you; and *therefore* light.
> (Act V, scene 2; my emphasis).

I think that the humour and irony, but mostly the lightness or playfulness that characterize this passage, would not be borne out as effectively without the use of the 'logical' connectives. *Therefore* underscores the contrast between the playful and sparkling language and the austere logical apodictic dimension that it introduces, thus enhancing the former.

Another example illustrating my point could be drawn from the junk mail we receive on a daily basis, especially if you live in the U.S. One day I received this:

> DR. E. KITIS
> YOU MAY HAVE ALREADY WON
> $100,000.00 CASH IN NEWSWEEK'S
> GOOD LIFE SWEEPSTAKES!

> Dear Friend:

> Your subscription expires soon, and if you tell me whether you will want to continue receiving NEWSWEEK…
> …you'll qualify for prizes valued over $164,000.00 in our newest giveaway!

>> Simply paste…………… the stamp……………………
>> Then, if just one of your exclusive Prize Numbers has been preselected……
>>   "Congratulations — you've won $100,000.00 cash!"

> …
> This is a winner-take-all prize — paid to you in one lump sum — to do with as you please.

There followed a most tempting description of how to spend this money, so that I almost believed it was a matter of a simple procedure to follow in order to acquire it. The letter ended with three "so's":

So peel off the $100,000 stamp from our envelope,
(my emphasis).

— which apparently I did to my utter dismay, because the stamp is missing. One of the reasons for my falling in the trap must have been the expert use of the connectives. *So*, for example, in this case has a double function: It operates both at the ideational level and the interpersonal level. In its former function, *so* serves to logically connect the text-created wonder world with the next step that is almost logically necessitated: To say YES to the sub-scription by posting the stamp. In its latter function, *so* both displays the author's and invokes the addressee's reasoning power. The connection, of course, is not logical in the ordinary sense of the word. What is there is a simulated argument which is borne out in the formula of a cause-and-effect inference and it is partly these formulae, the connectives *if…then* and *so*, that do the magic. They thus contribute to the ideological construction of the prospective consumer (Fairclough 1989: 46, 102ff).

Connectives, as cohesive devices (Halliday and Hasan 1976), set up different types of relation between clauses and sentences, reflecting, but also constructing, a wide range of relations between states of affairs, events, etc. That is to say, connectives can locate such events in a certain network of relations. As Fairclough (1992: 174) writes:

Text types differ in the sorts of relation that are set up between their clauses, and in the sorts of cohesion they favour, and such differences may be of cultural or ideological significance[8] (Fairclough 1992: 174).

A prime example of this function of connectives, again, is offered by Thatcher's interview quoted in Fairclough (1992: 175):

MT: it is radical *because* at the time when I took over we needed to be radical e: it is populist I wouldn't call it populist I would say that many of the things which I've said strike a chord in the hearts of ordinary people why *because* they're British *because* their character IS independent *because* they DON'T like to be shoved around *coz* they ARE prepared to take responsibility *because* they DO expect to be loyal to their friends and loyal allies that's why you call it populist. I say it strikes a chord in the hearts of people I know *because* it struck a chord in my heart many many years ago.

Notice how this sentimental ideologization is purportedly rationalized by a cascade of *because*-clauses.[9]

5. Connectives and Generalized Conversational Implicature (GCI)

As the focus of this paper is the connective *and*, I will briefly discuss what is considered to be an influential account in terms of conversational implicatures. The objective of the discussion is to demonstrate the necessity of postulating consistent knowledge frames as constraining conjunction.

Grice (1975) suggested that the extra-logical aspects of the meaning of *and* should be accounted for in terms of inferences he dubbed *generalized conversational implicatures*. While they are conversational as they are derived by appeal to the co-operative principle, generalized conversational implicatures are also indeterminate and specifiable in terms of the utterance in which the connective (*and*) occurs; however, they are derived irrespective of the context in which their utterances occur and can, therefore, be called 'generalized'. Just like all conversational implicatures, they are defeasible or cancellable, as Grice would say, and this characteristic is primarily what distinguishes this type of implicature generated by connectives such as *and, or, if*, as compared to conventional implicatures of *but* and *therefore*.[10]

Atlas and Levinson (1981), and Levinson (1987, 1995) offer accounts of the non-logical aspect of the meaning of *and* in terms of implicatures that actually enrich 'what is said' "to a narrower range of possible states of affairs associated with 'what is communicated'. 'What is communicated' is *more precise* than 'what is said'" (Atlas and Levinson 1981: 36).

Levinson (1995) claims that *and* generates Q2[11] generalized conversational implicatures, which, as he writes, are attuned to stereotypes. Moreover, inferences generated by *and* contribute to "the maximisation of coherence, the minimisation of postulated entities and the presumptive enrichment of mentioned relations" (Levinson 1995: 101).[12] He notes that conjunction, or paratactic adjunction, is "presumptively enriched to suggest sequential occurrence of events and, further, intention and causality" (ibid.). His examples are the following:

> (18)   a. Ann rang the bell *and* the engine started.
>   b. Ann rang the bell and *then* the engine started.

    c. Ann rang the bell and *therefore* the engine started.
    d. Ann rang the bell, *thereby intending* the engine to start.

While Levinson acknowledges that heuristic Q2 generalized conversational implicatures are oriented towards stereotypes (see its definition), he nevertheless claims that these enriched interpretations of *and*-conjunction are present even in the absence of stereotypical connections, as purportedly example (18) demonstrates.

    However, this is not the case, as I showed in discussing referential problems (Kitis 1987b, c). Examples in (19) demonstrate my point:

(19?) a. They climbed up the tree *and* rang the bell.
      b. They climbed up the tree and *then* (they) rang the bell.
      c. They climbed up the tree and *therefore* they rang the bell.
      d. They climbed up the tree, *thereby intending* to ring the bell.

As I claimed then, the conjunction of *p* and *q* is interpretable in terms of our cognitive and experiential abilities to subsume it within frames or scripts that are either identical or compatible between them. The conjunction is interpretable if we replace the second clause with a proposition that instantiates a track of the initial frame that is called up:

(19i) They climbed up the tree *and* picked the fruit.

Or else, if we replace the *p*-conjunct following the same rule:

(19ii) They walked up the stairs *and* rang the bell.

The reader can supply the remaining enriched glosses. Whereas both (19i) and (19ii) suggest enriched interpretations, all examples in (19) are uninterpretable. They cannot be contextualized either in a specific discourse or, more broadly, within a situation type (see Kitis 1982: ch. 7).

    In conclusion, whereas strong stereotypical connections, as in Levinson's (1995) adapted examples,[13] may be missing, my examples in (19) clearly demonstrate that in order to accept *and*-conjunctions (indeed like any conjunction) as interpretable such connections (even if attenuated) have to be inferred so that they can be *somehow* accommodated within our system of stereotypical knowledge. This is not the prerogative of *and*. There are some languages, like Greek, in which the type of causal connective is selected in terms of instantiating (activating) more or less stereotypical knowledge considered to be generalized (Kitis forthcoming [a]).[14]

As a preliminary conclusion, therefore, we can say that *and*-conjunction instantiates (sub)frame or (sub)script compatibility. But what are frames and how do they interact with emotive rhetorical uses of *and*? In the next section I will briefly present some instrumental concepts for my proposal.

6.   Frames, evaluation, and ideology

In sections 2 and 3 I examined some uses of connectives that derive their import from stereotypical knowledge they activate. This knowledge or ideologies constitute the *hypotextual premises* on which the connective draws for its interpretation. Such stereotypical knowledge and ideologies are best represented in terms of frames and scripts.[15]

Frame theory provides a comprehensive proposal for representing background knowledge and beliefs in a comprehensible systematic way. Minsky's is the classical account of what frame theory is:

> Here is the essence of the frame theory: When one encounters a new situation (or makes a substantial change in one's view of a problem), one selects from memory a structure called a *frame*. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary (Minsky 1975: 211).

Frame theory, in effect, provides an explanation for the Gestalt aspects of human perception and understanding. Attention to detail often blocks meaning and meaning creation or assignment requires also a holistic outlook. When we are confronted with a new situation, we can comprehend it whenever we can accommodate it within our schematic experiential topography — and that is how meaning is derived. Meaning and therefore interpretation, is the upshot of the conjunction of the old and the new (Kitis 1982: ch. 7; Sperber and Wilson 1986: 138). Frames play a crucial role in meaning derivation; they can be thought of as the receptacles of linguistic data. They are knowledge structures with empty slots that are, in default of other specifications, filled in with default-values and correspond to language users' expectations, thus guiding them in making sense of what they hear or read. Understanding language therefore is a top-down, frame-driven and expectation-based enterprise.

However, the relationship between linguistic manifestations and their abstract cognitive structures is not unilateral. There is a two-way relationship

between them: Linguistic items that we have learned in our linguistic lives as performing certain functions, or as conveying certain meanings, can be (quite often manipulatively) used with the purpose of actually forcing or coercing those functions and meanings, even in contextual configurations disallowing them. In Section 4 I tried to explore precisely this function of connectives in advertising (see also Kitis 1997).

The other concept that needs some comment is that of evaluation.[16] In cognitive models of evaluation one might distinguish various levels: The level of background knowledge representation, the level of its accessibility, and the level of the synthesis or configurations generating evaluations — although connectionist modeling (McClelland and Rumelhart 1986) claims to have overcome problems arising from such distinctions. Frames, scripts and similar abstract structures have been successfully used in knowledge and belief representation in memory at the first level.[17] The level of accessibility to, or activation of, such frames and schemata poses severe problems to date. It is not clear how activation of specific frames is implemented and coordinated. But we can assume that the formal grammatical device for coordination of linguistic components also effects a coordination of (sub)domains of knowledge roughly corresponding to, or reflected in, the propositional contents of the components thus coordinated.[18]

Since belief-systems are also structured in tight frames, they can be said to represent ideologies *qua* mental representations as well, for ideologies are tightly structured belief-systems. As van Dijk (1997: 28) writes, "Ideologies are…both social systems, while shared by groups, as well as *mental representations*". Despite the complications involved in the use of the controversial term *ideology*, I will adopt it for the purposes of this study, because it provides a rather global dimension of representations (not encompassed by the term *evaluation*) inasmuch as it signifies "maximally general contexts" (Malrieu 1999: 5). It is global because it catches in its net various perspectives on the social world and can be seen as a system of evaluations, rather than nonce or one-off evaluations. Moreover, despite the fact that evaluations reflect attitudes based on social cognition that derives from ideologies, we might need to distinguish between the two notions because, not only does the former (ideology) signify a rather more intricate system of evaluations, but it is itself evaluated. So the latter term (evaluation) can have a more instrumental use for our purposes.

On the other hand, ideologies as systems of values involve both the normative and evaluative dimensions. As such their target is wider audiences and their acquisition of doxastic evaluative dispositions (for example *IF +communist THEN −nice*). Evaluation is a synthesis of cognitive appraisals of cognitive domains (Malrieu 1999) and the latter are represented in frames (Minsky 1975) and schemata (Rumelhart 1975), scripts (Schank and Abelson 1977) and scenarios, mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983), Idealized Cognitive Models (Lakoff 1987) and mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985).[19]

The concept of value, and hence evaluative effects, is therefore inextricably connected with frames, schemata and ultimately with categorization (Mandler 1982; Ortony 1991; Malrieu 1999). Evaluation is based either on existing frames or it is the product of their dynamic configurations which can be seen as a bridge between them. Such configurations can be either positively or negatively evaluated. Since evaluation is synthetic, connectives can often act as operators in configuring knowledge and belief frames (e.g., generic sentences) or particular instantiations of them. It is precisely in this function that they can act as stance-operators. As I have argued (Kitis 1997; Kitis and Milapides 1997) and as is widely accepted, ideological formations depend not just on the linguistic resources, but on specific selections made within those resources (Lakoff 1996). I submit that connectives as configuration operators (configurators) afford a first order device for ideological formations. Moreover, as these ideological formations are activated or constructed by means of connectives at a hypotextual level, they are not negotiable material, and as such they can have a covert and very strong impact (see (2) and (3) above; see also Kitis and Milapides 1997). This grants connectives a potential for being used as first rate rhetorical devices (see below (22), (a), (b), advertisement, and Thatcher interview).

7.   Why do we need a frame analysis for connectives?

Let us come back to the case of the *and*-conjoined utterances we identified in which both *p* and *q* may be known propositions, as in most of our examples ((4), (5), (7), (9), which are real data). How can we explain the *raison d'être* of such utterances in terms of the function of the conjunction, and by that I mean the conjoining of the two propositions? König (1985) mentions some cases of co-ordinating conjunctions that may have a concessive meaning, as he calls it, in some contexts:

(20)   I have to do all this work and you are watching TV.

He writes:

> In certain contexts…the literal meaning of expressions from certain
> semantic domains ('simultaneity', 'concomitance', etc.) is augmented by
> concessive inferences. The universal character of this process suggests that
> this augmentation is based on conversational maxims and the implications
> in question are conversational implicatures (König 1985: 275).

However, there are many difficulties inherent in this approach. Explaining
such linguistic phenomena in terms of conversational implicatures gives rise
to many problems that have been discussed elsewhere (Koutoupis-Kitis 1982,
1987b, c). Indeed, König raises some of them when he wonders which
maxims really are involved in the generation of the implicatures:

> But which maxims exactly are involved and how is it possible to construct
> an argument that would lead from those maxims and the literal meaning
> of utterances…to the concessive implicature? It is quite clear that the
> inferences in question are not based on violations of conversational
> maxims and do not require specific situational contexts except that two
> facts are known to be normally *in conflict*. It follows that, if anything,
> they can only be generalized conversational implicatures (König
> 1985: 275, my emphasis).

Moreover, if these examples are glossed as concessive conjunction, their
import is completely lost, as we have seen in (9i), repeated here, and in (20i):

(20)   i.   Although I have to do a lot of work, you're watching TV.

(9)   i.   Although her husband is in hospital, she's hanging around
                with men.[20]

The major problem that besets any account of general linguistic phenomena
in terms of conversational implicature, however, is that of *unconstrainability*
(Koutoupis-Kitis 1982; Kitis 1987b, c, 1998, 1999). What has been called
'generalized conversational implicature' needs to be seen as constrained by
the *availability* of systematic knowledge accessed in conditional statements,
or else there is no way of excluding examples such as those in (19). It often
appears that this approach deprives these phenomena of their generality.

    In Sections 2 and 3, we discussed some dynamic uses of connectives
that activated either very general ideological or knowledge schemata or more
particular knowledge or belief schemata pertaining to more specific frames.

I propose to adopt frame theory in order to use frames as the main constraining factor in accounting for the function of connectives at the level of propositional meaning (see below).

An account based in the frame-theoretic formalism (Minsky 1975) can supplement an account of implicatures, providing its theoretical ground, rather than resorting to unconstrained implicatures, obscure pragmatic presuppositions or contextual implications. Such an account will gain in rigour as well as in generality.[21] Description of such functions of connectives will provide the requisite theories for computer scientists to assist them in the construction of intelligent knowledge representation structures and of intelligent natural language simulated programs. Robinson (1986: 146), for example, observes, regarding a constructed language:

> DIAGRAM's rules for conjoining should be taken primarily as experimental placeholders, awaiting the time when linguistic theory yields more insight into the nature of conjunction and the constraints to be obeyed. Currently, Rules SX1 and SX2 define sentence conjunction and accept sentences like
>
> > I went there but he wasn't there.
> > He came, he saw, and he conquered
>
> (Robinson 1986: 146).

Moreover, reference to such knowledge frames and ideological schemata will explain uses of connectives in a unified manner, whereas at present they are accounted for in terms of various types of pragmatic concepts. In other words, such frames will afford a common denominator. 'Deviant' language or 'deviant' uses of connectives will, then, be explicable by reference to the degree of deviation from such frames, which are constructed according to the 'norm', i.e., reflecting the general typification of the perception of generally shared background knowledge and beliefs.

In current theories of general conversational implicature (GCI) this constraining factor of the norm is totally missing, thereby allowing the generation of unconstrained speaker-implicature. As we have seen, in Levinson's account, there is no gradation of acceptability between sentences such as *Mart turned the switch and the motor started,* to (18), to the total unacceptability of (19). Positing frame theory as a constraining factor will soak up (speakers') generalized implicatures in a systematically accounted for knowledge-tank, whereas at present these implicatures seem to be dependent on speakers' rather haphazard and unsystematic general knowledge.

This argument would also *mutatis mutandis* carry over to a relevance-theoretic account.

For example, 'eccentric' writing, jokes or humour, are mostly generated by switching round our ideological frames, or scripts (Attardo 1997), i.e., by a consistent effort to violate the balance of the system, by, mostly abortive, attempts at generating subversive frames or scripts (see Kitis 1999 and forthcoming [b] for a comprehensive proposal), as can be seen from both the following quotation from *Time* (where the normal, general, law-like conditional statement of the form $p \supset q$ is reversed, thus subverting our expectations), and the cartoon text below:

(a) You've got to hand it to Calvin Klein: he really knows how to milk an advertising campaign, even a doomed one. First you push the envelope until it splits open by putting pubescent models in lurid poses, then plaster them on billboards and magazines — and air them on TV. *If you're lucky, parents, the Catholic League and other religious groups will protest, especially over the video*

   (*Time,* September 11, 1995, my emphasis).

(b) Cartoon text: (two teenagers talking)
   A: I don't believe this! Grandpa declared all his income to the inland revenue this year.
   B: *So,* he's still brain-damaged from the stroke.
   A: Yeah, life sucks (my emphasis).

In (a) the 'normal' communal ideology represented as framed background knowledge that is subverted in the conditional (in italics) is something like: *One is better off if one is not the target of protestation.* In (b) the connective *so* subverts the well attested law-like statement or regularity: *If one is a law-abiding citizen (either volitional or compulsory state) one has to be truthful in one's dealings with institutions like the inland revenue.*

Recourse to frame theory will also explain the use of connectives as emotive devices, the type of connective we identified in Section 3. We are now in a position to explain why *and*, instead of the prototypical adversative or contrastive *but,* is used to register our criticism or involvement, i.e., to convey a certain attitude (not necessarily negative) towards the conjoined propositions. The function of *but* will be that of calling up a distinct frame, which we can comprehend as a separate, even if related, field of our back-

ground knowledge and ideologies. *But* can function as a pointer towards orienting the addressee and projecting him or her into distinctly structured frames (*He's short but he's an athlete*).[22] *But* can also function within the same frame in order to amplify or slightly modify default values, but it can also act as a backtrack device. It can select specific default values in order to reject them or replace them with other values, which however need not be outside the domain of permissible variation fillers (*It's a small flat but it's nice*).[23]

And, on the other hand, is the connective *par excellence* to be used in order to conjoin *predictable default values* within the same frame, but also to amplify or modify them. Both *but* and *and* can create subframes within the same frame. *And* is also used to conjoin related, but not incompatible, frames. Incompatible frames are those ones that include within their structures default values that are incompatible. Incompatibility needs to be defined, however: By incompatibility I certainly do not assume assignment of contradictory values (+ or −), which can be accepted at variance by the system. Incompatibility, again, will have to be determined in terms of the overall construction of the frame-system, as it will be structured in bigger chunks. Frames, therefore, will have to be embedded into hyper-frames.

And, in the cases we identified, functions in a way that is not 'tolerated' by the system; its aim is to make an abortive attempt at conjoining two incompatible frames, and this explains its function as a rhetorical device signalling an emotive attitude (see below). The incompatibility of the conjunction is made prominent by the use of the connective *and*. Due to this potential *and* affords, it can be called 'antinomial' too, because it creates antinomies in subverting our well-attested conditional statements. The addressee, who shares, or quite often is assumed to share, the same knowledge or ideological system of frames, will be oriented towards inferring the reasons explaining this incompatible conjunction, and will thereby derive its ideological import or the speaker's emotive or evaluative stance. *And*, therefore, can act as a subjectivity marker, since it orients the hearer to interferring the speaker's attitude towards the propositional content of the utterance. This inferential process is based on the hearer's assumption that the speaker or author is both charitable and co-operative (and not insane). I would have no objections to calling such inferences GCIs as long as they are systematically constrained in a generalized and predictable fashion. However, in default of a frame-theoretic underpinning there is no way of accounting for *and* implicatures as contrastive. Grice nowhere talked about *and*-contrast.

Frame analysis can also provide an explanation of jokes when their generation is due to the construction of a subversive frame that is considered funny, most often because it subverts the ideological world as we have grown up to know and acknowledge it (Kitis forthcoming [b]). Frame analysis will also explain carefully selected wording in the discourse of advertising for maximization of impact, as can be seen from the anti-climactic use of *and* in the following advertisement:

> **Pythagoras' Theorem Contains 24 words.**
>
> **Archimedes' Principle, 67.**
>
> **The Ten Commandments, 179.**
>
> **The American Declaration of Independence, 300.**
>
> ***And* recent legislation in Europe concerning when and where you can smoke, 24,942.**
>
> **Phillip Morris Europe S.A.**

[*The Economist,* my emphasis]

And, in contrast to *but,* orients the reader to detect similarity of attributes, values, etc. The tension generated by the enumeration of history-making texts is gradually built up, as we read through, and reaches its anti-climax when all this is *and-* (rather than *but-*) juxtaposed to legislation for insignificant matters. The impact of this conjunction is enhanced by an increase in figures, as in our western culture we have learned to associate increasing numbers and copiousness with significance. Thus, the 24,942 words of insignificant legislation are characterized as unnecessary prolixity.

And trades on being the prototypical connective for linguistically conjoining perceptual and conceptual similarity and expectancy. It cashes in on its potential for registering the norm, when it is used to conjoin, or rather coerce, data that are not assimilable to a frame or a prototype or an endorsed category. It is in this function that *and* generates maximal contrasts not 'tolerated' by, or inscribed in, the system of knowledge and beliefs underpinning language

comprehension and production. But, as Malrieu (1999: 74) notes, deviations from the standard have been very much overlooked in cognitive science.

Programmatically, one can claim that frame analysis will also provide a more consistent and coherent framework for explaining distinct functions of the contrastive connective *but* in languages in which it is realized by distinct lexical forms as in Greek, Spanish, German, and Hebrew.[24] Frame analysis can also afford a more generalized framework for accounting for causal connectives. For example, in Kitis (1994, 1996, forthcoming [a]) it is claimed that the Greek causal connectives, lexicalized by distinct forms, can perform distinct functions in which they are not interchangeable, just as the Greek adversatives *αλλά/ala, όμως/omos* and *μα/ma* are not always interchangeable and their occurrence can be determined by particular contexts (Kalokerinos and Karantzola 1992; Slings 1997). In Kitis (forthcoming [a]) I claim that the selection of the causal connective can be governed by considerations related to systematically framed background knowledge, such as generalized causal relations rather than subjective erratic pseudo-causality. But comprehensive research remains to be done in this area.

Schematically, the function of the connective *and* discussed above might look as in Figure 1 (note that the represented frames A and B, and their subparts, are incompatible — culturally, ideologically, world-knowledge-wise — and cannot, as a result, be *and*-conjoined in that their conjunction — union — 'exudes' tension).


Figure 1. *Emotive or 'subversive' hypo-textual 'and'*

The emotive or 'subversive' antinomial element attaching to such uses of *and* has its source in the extra conceptual effort (hence 'tension') that is needed in the construction of frames that are characterized as incompatible between them at some level (cf. *Economist* ad, Calvin Klein *Time* text [a], cartoon text [b]).

Moreover, conflictual evaluations need to be articulated because they are thus acknowledged, and acknowledging the presence of a conflict is perhaps the first step towards its comprehension, resolution or acceptance. Articulating a conflict in the requisite linguistic form, for example by means of *but*, one can thereby compromise it, if not resolve it. On the other hand, if a conflict is left unarticulated, it tends to generate confusion and may lead to the disintegration of the text's coherence. If a conflict, however, *is* purportedly[25] articulated with the help of a paradigmatic connective, usually employed for articulating non-conflictual evaluations, as is shown in Figure 1, then not only does it remain unresolved (unacknowledged, unaccepted), but it also has a greater impact on its audience. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of examples such as (a), (b) or the *Economist* ad. The various (sub)components of distinct frames (domains of knowledge) are activated and coerced into a purportedly blissful coordinated state implemented by the paradigmatic coordination *and.* The tension thus derived can occur at all the levels of such a coordination (frames, subframes or specific values). In all cases, though, we need to postulate the presence of frames representing compact knowledge and belief structures as the ground upon which synthetic evaluations operate.

Why is *and* used as a rhetorical device to achieve maximal reflexive contrastive evaluations of the conjunction of two incompatible frames in the form of propositions *p* and *q*? A coordinate conjunction of conflictual states may be infelicitous if it does not achieve interpretation in the form of a *p and q* locution. The addressee knows that the speaker can use *but* for conjoining conflictual frames. When s/he sees that the speaker does not do so, the addressee is bound to interpret the *p and q* conjunction (*p, q* conflictual) as a reflexive evaluation or self-evaluation — i.e., as registering the speaker's stance on the conjunction at issue. As *p* and *q* instantiate conflictual incompatible frames, the reflexive evaluation generated is likely to range from disbelief to criticism.

In general, a reflexive evaluation signifies the speaker's subjective point of view, but also involvement, as the speaker's stance remains unlexicalized in a conventional linguistic form (*I think, my view is that, I disagree*, etc.). In

short, *and* can signify the speaker's empathy. It is precisely this potential, which can be capitalized upon by speakers, that renders *and* a very good candidate for rhetorical uses. Figure 2 depicts how *and* can be used as a rhetorical device to register the speakers' (and hence to give rise to the audience's) evaluation of the conjunction of the two frames or components thereof. It is also compared to *but*.[26]


Figure 2. *Reflexive evaluation of 'and'-rhetorical structures*

However, this use of *and* at the propositional level is only one of the many possible uses at this level. Indeed, we need to postulate a continuum along which functions of *and* can be identified and specified: from its purely logical-conjoining function to the ones discussed here, to subversive ones, to completely unacceptable or uninterpretable, but still truth-functional ones, as shown in Figure 3.

The upper line represents the linguistic level, the bottom one the cognitive level where knowledge representation is embedded. All uses can be truth-functional within a model-theoretic semantic framework; however, acceptability and interpretability at this conceptual level of use is frame-dependent (dotted lines showing correspondence), as we can see in Figure 3.

functions of 'and' [propositional level]

logical: truth-functional   logical: truth-functional
+acceptability/interpretability   subversive   –acceptability/interpretability

knowledge representation: frames/scripts [hypotextual level]

towards   total
(sub)frame/script   (sub)frame/script   frame/script
compatibility   incompatibility   incompatibility
concoctability   subversion   inconcoctability

Figure 3. *Functions of conceptual 'and'*

At the end of the scale marked by frame compatibility, we are likely to find 'normal' cases of *and* occurrences, such as (18), (19i) or (19ii), but also occurrences such as "He is a communist and(but) he has small feet".[27] 'Frame concoctability' is there to catch such examples that are difficult (but not impossible) to interpret out of context. At the other pole, marked by frame incompatibility/inconcoctability, we are likely to find conjunctions that, while being truth-evaluable, are not interpretable even in localized contexts (see Section 9) due to total lack of frame compatibility or concoct- ability: [?]"President Clinton is tall and my grass needs mowing", or the sentences in (19).

Midway we are likely to find occurrences of *and*-conjunction that orient towards frame incompatibility or frame subversion on which they draw for their interpretability. Marked hypotextual ideological uses of connectives are expected to be found in this middle domain, while around the pole of frame compatibility connectives do not construct new ideologies, but rather reinforce what ideologies are regarded as 'common sense'. Thus example (2)

(2)   He is a communist but he is a nice man.

belongs near the frame compatibility end, because in the specific era and culture (for example MacCarthy's America) it was common sense that communism was negatively evaluated. On the other hand, examples (3) in the same culture and era would be oriented towards forging a new ideology, rather than reinforcing old ones, and as such, they were marked uses attempting to subvert a frame and use it as their hypotextual premise (middle ground).[28]

Focusing on non-ideological instances, Levinson's (1995) example (18), while not pointing to a strongly stereotypical frame, is still interpretable

thanks to its potential for concocting a frame that will buttress its use. Frames, therefore, need to be seen as acting in a constraining fashion on the interpretation of conjunction. The case of *and*, and especially what I called its hypotextual function, has been examined here as providing evidence for the necessity of postulating frames as constraints on the use and interpretation of connectives.

8.   Alternative accounts

Blakemore and Carston (1999) discuss similar examples of non-narrative *and*-conjunction and while, as they write, my explanation (Kitis 1995) bears some interesting similarities to theirs, they prefer nevertheless to recast it in terms of the relevance-theoretic framework:

> The central point, again, is that the principle of relevance must be understood to be applying to the conjunction as a whole: it is the conjoined proposition which is assumed to carry the presumption of optimal relevance and which gives rise to the attitudinal effects. In contrast, *but* can only have its 'back-tracking' function (referring to my account) in (10) because the utterance is processed as two separate units of relevance (Blakemore and Carston 1999: 13–14).

Admittedly, a relevance-theoretic account is desirable for its elegance and solid linguistic orientation: it does not need to transgress barriers or borrow resources. However, as they themselves note, my proposal does not have to be incompatible with theirs. The difference between the two approaches is a difference of orientation. Their concern is to explain or enumerate the various functions of *and*, whereas my interest lies in a more profound explanation at the level of underlying assumptions that give rise to and constrain these functions. While their approach is linguistically motivated and/or restricted, mine is more cognitively and socially oriented. In other words, arguing that *and*-conjunctions can show an attitude just because the two conjuncts are processed together as a single unit, while it may provide a first heuristic, does not go a very long way either towards distinguishing evaluative rhetorical uses of *and* from other uses such as additive, sequential and causal ones, or explaining its mechanics. It only *allows* for the option, but then the account's explanatory power is considerably reduced (cf. Bach 1999).

On the other hand, there are advantages in adopting the perspective proposed here. As Blakemore and Carston acknowledge, their account cannot handle initial uses of *and*, such as (21):

(21)   A: I'm not sure that I liked John's friend. All he could talk about was logic.

       B: AND he'd never heard of relevance theory.

Clearly, as they admit, a relevance account of attitudinal uses of *and* outside a *p and q* construction is not feasible since the relevance principle applies to the whole conjunction as a unit. On the other hand, while initial uses of *and* operating at other levels of discourse (not the propositional) are not expected or intended to be handled within my proposal, those initial uses, like the ones in (21) and (22) below, which clearly have a function at the propositional level, can be handled within the frame-theoretic framework.[29] Within the proposed account, by *and*-prefacing his/her utterance, B in effect latches it onto A's. By conjoining the two propositions of (21) (*p* = 'all he could talk about was logic', *q* = 'he'd never heard of relevance theory') with *and* — the prototypical connective for conjoining expected values — the speaker (B) manages to also latch together two values or components, one predicted within the currently active frame (*linguist*), the other disallowed by it as conflictual. These two values conflict in their orientation precisely because one belongs to and aligns with the particular specifications of the frame at issue, while the other does not. In conjoining two incompatible values with *and,* the incompatibility and the conflictual state remain in effect unarticulated thus leading to an intensification of the ideological inconsistency. This tension results in communicating emotive attitudes. Therefore, the 'appropriate' conjunction to use in order to articulate the conflict in such conflictual cases would be *but*. But while B's *and*-introduced utterance shows that B shares A's evaluation ('I'm not sure that I liked John's friend'), *but* would also dissociate B from such an evaluation. So by *and*-prefacing his/her utterance, B manages to align it with A's evaluation of John's friend.[30]

It appears then that viewing *and* as the prototypical conjoining device functioning within the bounds of well attested stereotypical (sub)frames, will account for its rhetorical use in various genres as well as in conversational ones (cf. Figure 2). Witness the use of *and* in the following fragment of institutional discourse drawn taking place between an alleged rape victim, the Witness, and a defense Attorney:

(22) A: …you have had sexual intercourse on a previous occasion
            haven't you?
     W: Yes.
     A: On many previous occasions?
     W: Not many.
     A: Several?
     W: Yes.
     A: With several men?
     W: No.
     A: Just one.
     W: Two.
→A: Two. And you are seventeen and a half?
     W: Yes.

(Levinson 1979: 380)

Matsumoto (1999) (as well as Sköries 1998) uses this fragment (alongside many others) to argue that *and* is used in prefacing questions (or statement-questions, as he calls them) in institutional discourse to conjoin propositions into a coherent package of information. While he acknowledges the contrastive use of *and* in (22) (arrowed), he nevertheless fails to distinguish it from the other uses he examines, which clearly do not have any conceptual import and are operative only at a the level of the organization of conversation. *And* in (22) has a double function. It introduces a statement-question, thus packaging it within the same routine institutional piece of discourse. But it is primarily used as an expressivity rhetorical device at a conceptual level in order to effectively juxtapose, or anti-parathesize, by conjoining them (subversive and abortive use), frames that are attested to be ideologically divergent (*promiscuity* and *young age*). While the *promiscuity* frame is active in the background and arduously debated to be fully constructed[31] at all the lines of this fragment, the attorney uses *and* to introduce a new but incompatible frame. He thus manages to latch this new frame (*young age*), and hence its incompatibility, onto the already activated one (*promiscuity*) in the prototypical configuration preserved for configuring compatible (sub)frames. This unarticulated, and hence subversive and non-countenanced (in the sense of ideologically unacceptable), configuration generates a reflexive evaluation which is the very source of the generation of evaluative attitudes. This is a genuinely rhetorical use of *and*. It is precisely this rhetorical dimension in A's use of *and* that Matsumoto fails to recognize in his account when he writes that it can be equated with *but*.

Sköries (1998) also discusses some uses of *and* (similar examples are discussed in König 1985; Quirk 1954) verbalizing blames, but limits her attention to utterances with symmetric conjuncts containing indexicals, an *I* and a *you* bearing contrastive stress. Consequently, she sees the contrast as holding between the evaluation of two acts, rather than as a "semantic antinomy", making a response to it conditionally relevant. She concludes that the 'blame' attitude is implied in the use of *and*, whereas it would be expressed in the use of *but*, but she does not discuss either the type of implicature or the mechanics of its generation. Her account, therefore, just like a relevance theoretic one, does not go a long way towards explaining the phenomenon and is rather impoverished.

Levinson (1995) proposed that *and* generates generalized conversational implicatures, allowing for presumptive enrichment suggesting sequential occurrences, intention and causality. But it is not clear to me how one can derive contrastive antinomial (as in our examples) implicatures irrespective of the constraints that have been posited. Is one supposed to go through the whole gamut of presumptive meanings in order to arrive at the contrast generated by the conjunction? But this is not how speakers interpret what they hear. Moreover, it is of the essence of GCI that what is said is accepted as such in order to reason to the implicature. So what needs to be accepted with respect to (9) (*Her husband is in hospital and she is hanging out with friends*), is, first, the felicitous conjunction of the two propositions, so that we are enabled to advance to the derivation of the implicature. But what will this be? Surely not an inference to a "more specific interpretation, where what is implicated is a subcase, a specific instantiation, of what is said" (Levinson 1995: 102). The GCI undercuts the very basis on which it is supposedly derived. As for non-binary connectives such as the ones in (21), (22), Levinson's account would face the same problems as a relevance-theoretic one.

9.   Linear and triangular functions of connectives

In this section I want to present a distinction in the use of connectives at the ideational level. This distinction will provide the ground for an answer to objections raised about some uses of connectives that do not involve stereotypes and which, moreover, can even seem odd out of context. As one reviewer rightly pointed out to me,

(23)   He is a communist but has small feet

can find some context of use despite its oddity. Not only do I agree with the reviewer, but I also want to add that, indeed, there are contexts in which stereotypes are turned on their heads, so to speak (cf. Kitis 1982), within the context of locally constrained discourses where no stereotypes are involved at all. I argued extensively against R. Lakoff's (1971) and Grice's accounts of *but*. Grice, as is well known, employed the notion of conventional implicature and argued that the contrast holds between the two conjoined propositions. In Kitis (1982), however, I pointed out that *but* can act as an orienting signal guiding the hearer in his/her interpretation of the proposition, relative to a locally pre-set goal in a specific discourse.[32] Using Lakoff's examples turned on their heads in specific contexts, I demonstrated that her distinction between semantic-opposition *but* and denial-of-expectation *but* was untenable. Moreover, I claimed that the second conjunct in a *p but q* conjunction always carries more weight towards the attainment of the pre-set goal. So in (24):

(24)   He is a Republican but he is honest

but does not have to deny any expectations regarding the person's dishonesty on grounds of his republicanism, neither does it have to conventionally implicate à la Grice any contrast between his republicanism and his honesty, or indeed between republicanism and honesty in general. Rather, I argued, *but* is used to introduce antithetically oriented moves towards a targeted goal. One might think, for example, of a new Watergate-type conspiracy where the issue was recruiting republicans in order to raid the offices of the rival party. Considering the candidacy of X, I may utter (24), where *p* (*he is a Republican*) is regarded as a positive move towards attaining the goal of the specific discourse ("we will recruit him"), whereas *q* (*he is honest*) constitutes a negative (and weightier) move relative to the goal (local conclusion: "we won't recruit him").

Likewise, regarding Grice's original example,

(1)   She is poor but she is honest.

it may be argued that (1) uttered in the local discursive context of a discussion concerning the prospects of our son marrying a specific girl and pondering the pros and cons of the match, will not generate any conventional implicatures of contrast holding between (her) poverty and (her) honesty.

Rather, *p* (*she is poor*) is offered as a negative move towards the pre-set goal of the discussion pointing to the girl's poor qualifications, while *q* (*she is honest*) can be offered as a positive one towards the goal ("she qualifies"). So, if there is a contrast, it is a triangular one (see Figure 4) of each conjunct separately relative to the desired goal (the girl's qualification as a prospective bride based on the accumulation of positive attributes). And in this case the local evaluation directly derives from the more general one based on ideological frames. But the conditional of the ideological frame activated here is not of the order *If +poor then +dishonest*, but rather *If one is to qualify as a good bride then one must feature positive attributes (+rich, +honest, +pretty, etc.).* In fact, the activated ideological frame is not that of *honesty* but that of *marriage*. It is rather evident why Rieber's (1997) account of conventional implicatures as tacit performatives would fail in local contexts of triangular uses of *but*, since he views the tacitly suggested speech act as relative to the content of the first conjunct rather than to a pre-set prior goal orienting the local speech acts. I address this point in more detail in Kitis (in preparation).[33]

This type of use of connectives can be called local or triangular (Figure 4) as it orients itself toward a local goal. The linear or global use of connectives at the propositional level (providing our linguistic paradigm), on the other hand, is the one involving mostly stereotypes (even if in various formulations) and generally shared knowledge and beliefs, and this is the use we have been examining here.

Linear/Global use   Triangular/Local use

Goal G

p but q   p   but   q

Figure 4. *Global and local uses of 'but'*

In triangular or local uses of connectives, frames are assembled and evaluated locally, against the background of the specific pre-set goal, so that honesty (as in our examples) may receive a negative evaluation vis-à-vis the demands imposed locally by the conversational goal at hand (24) (e.g., ability/nerve to raid the offices of the rival party), or a positive one as in (1).

That does not, of course, mean that global evaluations do not have an impact on local ones since the latter often derive from the former (1). But it may mean that global evaluation may turn on its head at a local level when for example the globally positive evaluation of the attribute of honesty may be reversed to a negative one in certain contexts (24) (Kitis 1982).

If there are such nonce, local one-off uses of connectives, why should we be concerned with an account of connectives at the global level then? The answer is twofold. Firstly, because an account of connectives at the global level of their use will effectively capture their generalized theoretical function, which will be their core function. Secondly, because local uses usually derive from global ones.

However, it may very well be the case that triangular uses of connectives may be closer to the level of their interpersonal function at which we would account for non-general evaluations. As I claimed in the past (1982: ch. 4) (repeated in Blakemore 1987: 130) whether a connective appears in a single construction within the bounds of one speaker's turn and/or utterance (binary use), or whether it appears to 'connect' different speakers' utterances occurring at different turns cannot be a condition for determining its function. The account of connectives proposed within the framework of argumentation within language (Ducrot and associates) aims to capture their function within localized specific fragments rather than within maximal global contexts (see next section).

10.   Towards a comprehensive perspective

What has been proposed here is not so radically different from alternative accounts of conventional implicatures and GCIs even if it may appear so at first glance. What has been examined in greater detail is the function of *and* as a hypotextual contrastive, antinomial rhetorical device. It has also been proposed that this more specific function of *and* derives from its prototypical function which is the conjunction of propositions activating frames or components not 'judged' by the overall system as incompatible or conflictual. I also proposed the postulation of frames as active (even if at times inconspicuous) constraints on the interpretation of connectives.

However, the account proposed for this function of *and* derives from, and is part of a broader perspective on connectives at the conceptual level of their function. Within this perspective the core function of connectives will

be determined within the broader spectrum of our background knowledge and beliefs that are compactly structured in knowledge and ideology frames. The function of connectives in interaction with such frames can be called their default function. This default function 'absorbs' or encompasses the 'normal' communal, frame-consonant 'canonical' evaluations held by the vast majority of speech communities. It is in this light that I propose to view most of the current debate about the nature of the implicature. Consider, for instance, Rieber's (1997: 69) criticism of Blakemore's *but*-generated contextual assumptions: "The problem seems to be that while Blakemore may have correctly described this case (the reference is to example (25)), the case itself is hardly *typical*. Many if not most denial-of-expectation uses of *but* are simply not this *sly*" (my emphasis). What is being debated is the 'normalcy' of these contextual assumptions. Whether

(25)   John is a Republican but he is honest

generates (or not) any expectations regarding his honesty will be dependent on general background, frame-represented ideologies as to the relation holding between republicanism and honesty. Most discussion about conventional implicature centres on the type of extra-logical meaning generated by the use of the lexical items involved. In other words, the discussion has revolved primarily around the type of evaluation that is generated by such words. To say that two propositions contrast is to evaluate the one relative to the other. But such evaluations in most cases are dependent, as has been said, on ideological frames within which the configuration effected by means of the connective is operative.

My proposal is to view connectives within a frame semantics that provides the background for determining their default meanings and functions.[34] According to Malrieu (1999) such an approach need not in principle be at variance with truth-conditional semantics. He believes that "evaluation-oriented semantics, if ever achieved, will couple more easily with truth-conditional semantics" (p. 147). That such an account is compatible with truth-conditional semantics is not surprising since, embedded as it should be within global maximal contexts, it will in effect be tantamount to a decontextualized account. The apparent conflict in this statement is resolved if we recall that localized uses, even if they derive from global ones, may gravitate towards local (and hence not general) contexts; whereas global contexts, on the other hand, reflect the generalized evaluations encompassing the great

majority of more local ones. And generalized evaluations and ideologies constituting default contexts will yield default (hence decontextualized) evaluations.

This view comprises the claim that broad evaluation is an integral part of our compositional meanings; or else a simple (non-evaluative) compositional meaning would not yield the actual utterance meaning of the conjunction, but rather a sentence meaning of little interest. In the case of (9), for example, its compositional meaning would not be something like (i) 'Her husband is in hospital and she shouldn't be hanging around with friends as she is'. And yet, (i) reflects our linguistic intuitions or our interpretation of (9) when we hear it out of any context. Speakers of the language interpret sentences such as those we have examined as evaluative even when they hear them *in limbo*. It appears that these evaluations are conventional aspects of the meaning of these sentences as utterances. The question is whether our compositional meanings need not reflect these default interpretations. But this conventionalization of evaluation cannot be accounted for without taking into consideration the background ideological frames and the conditional statements invoked.

In frame semantics we can have the best of both worlds. We can account for the core functions of connectives within generalized contexts, which will serve as a base or frame of reference. We are not tied up in our implicatures or generated assumptions by an infinity of contexts, for "the context is potentially infinite and indefinite as a source of possible 'meanings'" (Dascal 1987: 276).

My proposal is slightly different from Malrieu's (1999) however, since he proposes a semantics of contextual modification, "in which *default evaluation* of an expression is transformed into a *contextual evaluation* under the influence of its linguistic context" (p. 147). I opt for the default evaluation in interaction with maximal contexts, aspiring to capture not only the core functions of lexical items but also a multiplicity of variations on them. In other words, I propose an account of connectives along their linear global function, i.e., within maximal contexts. It is only after we have solved problems in this terrain that we would be in a position to account for their triangular uses in localized contexts.

Whether this account should be a part of semantics or pragmatics depends on our definitions of the fields and it is rather a moot point. However, since language is hardly transparent and we mostly communicate "indirectly" (Dascal 1983, 1997), we might need to adopt a rather enlarged

and broadened semantics which will integrate into its boundaries phenomena such as our reliance upon general frames and schemata in the comprehension of utterances (Dascal 1987).[35] What is at issue is the maximization of contexts typified in frames interacting with linguistic data. In pragmatics we have a localization of maximal contexts (cf. triangular uses of connectives) and possibly a reversal of general frames, as well as idiosyncratic speaker meaning. On the other hand, within a framework that would take into account evaluation of not just lexical items but also of discourses within *typical* contexts (coupling frames with discourses), we may achieve descriptions of types or archetypes (Kitis 1999).

Within this perspective, we can couple (see Figure 3) the levels of truth-valuation and evaluation on the basis of framed knowledge substrata. Sentence-utterances will be evaluated if they satisfy conditions of truth in terms of global evaluations at a second stage. This procedure would assess such sentences as 'President Clinton is tall and my grass needs mowing', at the extreme of frame incompatibility/inconcoctability. While still truth-evaluable, these sentences would also appear as uninterpretable and hence inadmissible to our enlarged frame semantics. After all truth maintenance models are implemented on the basis of their dependencies on belief systems (cf. the vast research reported in cognitive science journals). But more localized contexts reflecting individual speaker-intention differentials will not be handled within this framework.

11.   Conclusion

It is commonplace now to say that meaning production is negotiated collectively; meaning production is a joint venture, an activity based on propositional content at the ideational level but also based on textual and interpersonal elements that are cued into the text. Moreover, as ideological contexts are not discrete tangible objects in which we embed our utterances and discourses, such contexts have also to be negotiated and jointly constructed. Connectives function at all these levels.

Focusing on their conceptual ideational function only, I claimed that connectives can also act as configurators of ideology. This function can be borne out even when they operate as mere *logical* connectives, or else as *empty* connectives. As such, they can either 'coerce' an inferential process or

inculcate certain, sometimes putatively necessary, relations between enunciat-
ed ideas, facts, events or states of affairs in the form of propositions.
Connectives, then, function as pointers towards generating or affirming those
assumed relations. (cf. Section 4). In this function connectives are conse-
quential for the generation of certain ideologies; for example, logical non-
textual connectives are profusely used, as we have seen, in the new discours-
es of advertising and the mixed discourses of junk mail for the construction
of the consumer. Moreover, this function can be capitalized upon for the
production of humorous effects and stark contrasts, as we have seen in the
extract from Shakespeare.

We also identified another function of connectives that I called *hypo-
textual*, since connectives in this function can be identified as stance-opera-
tors, operating at the level of the hypo-text. Connectives, not unlike the rest
of our linguistic signs, can be heteroglossic and diaglossic (Bakhtin 1981),
or polyphonic as Ducrot (Žagar 1996) would say, because they are character-
ized by double directionality. They project towards the world, but they also
project into other discourses and therefore they are ideological. The hypo-
text that is constructed by the presence of the connective lies beyond the text
that is *in presaentia* at the moment of the enunciation of the utterance. It
may be shared by the interlocutors, or it may address other discourses.[36] It
may be negotiated at the moment of the interpretation or comprehension of
the text, or it may be constructed by the speaker or author. Indeed, the
construction of the hypo-text may be the sole reason for the production of
the text that hypo-constructs it, as we have seen in our examples. It is in this
function that connectives can predominantly act 'in collusion' with frames as
rhetorical devices to generate reflexive evaluations and therefore emotive
attitudes, nuances, ideologies, or involvement. The only reason, for example,
for uttering (9) or (26) in some cases:

(9)   Her husband is in hospital and she is hanging around with
       friends.

(26)   She is married and she sleeps around.

may be the intention of the speaker to register his or her criticism, to convey
some form of emotive meaning or evaluative attitude, or to give rise to some
form of reaction; *and* may be used to *inscribe* one's involvement. In sum,
the reason for uttering the above sentences may be no other than the intend-
ed construction of, or allusion to, a hypo-text that the speaker either shares

with or wants to convey to the addressee. However, this function is possible only with the collaboration of frames or scripts. Active invocation of hypothetical law-like, quasi-logical statements of the form $p \supset q$ that are the content of frames, is either intended or assumed by the producer of the text. In cases in which both p and q are known to the addressee, the sole reason for their linguistic enunciation may be the negotiated construction of their conjunction in a frame that is not countenanced by the speaker and/or hearer, or cannot be accommodated within the existing topography of their ideological terrain. In particular, the hypo-constructed entailment $p \supset q$ (Kitis 1999) will not form part of the inference procedure of the system. So, conceptual or semantic *and* can be a rhetorical rule of the system represented as a production rule (Anderson 1983) that has a dynamic interactant function in artificial intelligence programs.[37] This function will be parasitic, or an outgrowth, on its prototypical function that will involve a default inference, i.e., the 'felicitous' conjunction of two frames or subframes or default values therein. In terms of default logic, such subverted antinomial conditional statements (*IF-THEN*, e.g., 'If one is married one sleeps around') would not form default statements in non-monotonic logic (Bobrow 1980; Reiter 1980).

In other words, the connective *and* as discussed here brings together under the same frame values for default ends that do not slot-in felicitously, that is, values that are rejected by the existing system as incompatible (+married, +sleeping around). But it is its prototypical function that makes conjoined propositional or ideational content that is rather incongruous all the more rejectionable as not constituting part of the ideological frame topography of our ideological systems. It is the connective that acts as the trigger of the speaker's, or to use a Lacanian term, of the *other's,* hypo-text at an ideological level that is not inscribed in frame-represented knowledge or ideologies. This hypo-text activated by the connective is either intended to be communicated or sneakily presupposed or plainly assumed or intended to even disturb equilibria in some contexts as in (22) (hence its rhetorical potential).

Viewed from the angle of cognitive science, connectives might be said to be responsible for activating or creating subframes in some cases, subversive frames in others, and for the abortive construction of frames in still other ones (Figure 3). It is not unrealistic to hypothesize that in the future cognitive science will be able to construct models of language encompassing a vast number of social concomitants as well as a great range of knowledge-and-belief-schemata together with the requisite mechanisms for handling

abortive or subversive constructions of frames. Such attempts will in some cases either reinforce and reaffirm the ideological nature of the main frames and in others it will amplify existing frames or generate new frames representing new ideological schemata.

I have argued here that connectives such as *and*, operating at a conceptual level, can act as evaluative or stance-operators in as much as they can configure knowledge and ideology schemata, often in intricate ways, thus generating reflexive evaluations. The underlying assumption all along has been that evaluation is produced by schemata configurations (see Malrieu 1999). The difficulties confronting such approaches to connectives are identical to the difficulties confronting cognitive modelling of evaluation, and are well appreciated. But some headway has been made into accounting for evaluative processes in connectionist schema theory (Smolensky 1986, for example) and more recently within a frame of dynamically assembled and configured schemata.[38]

Quite apart from the inherent difficulties besetting the even gradual construction of modest programs, a major problem arises from the ever-changing frames. Because knowledge representation has to grapple not only with cultural issues but also with historical aspects of cultural issues. When Jane Austen wrote 200 years ago: "It was moonlight, and everybody was full of engagements", she knew that the conjunction in this case was perfectly understandable because there was at the time the relevant frame shared by English speakers subsuming in its structure a busy life during moonlight. In our age this frame is extinct and has only a place in history as a historical fact.

Another problem in accounting for knowledge in terms of such schemata will have to do with knowledge specific to smaller than the speech community groups, such as the family or the workplace, as becomes clear in examples such as (5). This type of knowledge posed a major problem in schematizing background knowledge in terms of scripts and frames, and made me (Koutoupis-Kitis 1982) opt for two distinct classes of context as aiding language comprehension, the Standing Background Knowledge and Beliefs (SBKBs) and the Current Mutual Contextual Assumptions (CMCAs), even if in most cases the latter derive from the former. Indeed, Nelson (1996) identifies a similar problem when she writes that the script construct as was developed by Schank and Abelson did not differentiate between social (intermental) and individual (intramental) knowledge. She proposes to subsume both specific and general mental representations of events in one

type of construct, which she calls mental representations of events (MERs). And Allen (1995: 392) claims that two forms of knowledge are crucial in knowledge representation systems: "general knowledge of the world and specific knowledge of the current situation". In Section 9 we saw how these two types of knowledge can bear on differential uses of connectives. Our discussion here, however, has gravitated towards global uses of connectives at the conceptual level. It is at this level that connectives can function hypotextually, too.

I think there is reason to claim that the *hypo-textual* function of connectives must be singled out as the most important function at the ideational level of language for a critical analysis of discourse, as it has dire repercussions for the generation or perpetuation of ideological schemata and complexes. While at the present stage of research it seems quite a remote prospect, there might be a time when ideological schemata will be, not only frame-represented, but also those mechanisms might be constructed that will handle, not only their invocation, but also their interaction. Such networks and models will be expected to be able to simulate natural speech and written language, and — hazarding a wild guess — there might even emerge mechanized formal methods for intelligent "reading" of not only texts but also of hypo-texts. However remote this scenario might be, it is worth keeping in mind. For, as Malrieu (1999: 69) argues, the work of the expert in cognitive science would be "to rebuild, beyond linguistic confusion, an ordered semantic world where all types of realities and corresponding mental processes could be clearly distinguished". But, as he also adds, such an undertaking is far too optimistic a hope.

For the time being, we must appreciate the generality of background knowledge schemata as well as of normative statements, rationality principles and patterned regularities. All of them are represented in our conceptual world in the form of nomic conditional statements ($p \supset q$). Such general statements form the 'rational' backdrop of invoked instantiated premises by the use of various connectives (Kitis 1999). It has long been recognized in philosophy, linguistics and cognitive science that the conditional *IF p THEN q* is used to express various types of information ranging from scientific laws through quasi-law statements, rationality principles and general patterns, to causal relations (Elio and Pelletier 1997). It is also worth recalling that universal quantification is expressed in conditional statements.

The perspective suggested in this study is meant to highlight "the more amorphous background of context" (Goodwin and Duranti 1992: 10). Moreover, it seeks to redress the balance from concentrating merely on the focal event (connectives) to shifting attention to the need for organizing the background, which after all acts in a systematic way constraining the focal event. Treating the former (focal event) while neglecting the latter (organized knowledge) will not yield desirable results. Neither should we treat the latter by means of the former only.

Furthermore, such structured schemata or frames also act as constraints on accessing relevance; they cannot, therefore, be relegated to hearer's processing potential for accessing relevance on the grounds of those connectives alone irrespective of the quite independent *availability* of those schemata (as is the case in Blakemore 1987). For if this were the case, one would not detect speaker's attempts at subverting those schemata, thereby creating funny or 'unexpected' situations (for example, *Time* fragment or cartoon text). Neither could one explain the powerful use of *and* we singled out, nor why *and* is more powerful and therefore preferred in this use, than *but* or *although.*

Equating this conceptual import of connectives with their function identified in Kitis (1982) as 'orienting signals' within an argumentative structure, or as developed by Schiffrin (1987) as discourse markers, or merely with Blakemore's (1987) procedural meaning, is to jettison a great deal of conceptual generality, derivable from generalized evaluations, in favour of methodological simplicity and elegance. We need to treat connectives at the distinct levels of language use at which they function even if it turns out that there is a consistent evolutionary line of derived functions. For, indeed, one must not account uniformly for cases of connectives such as some of the ones examined here, for example (3) and (27).

(27)   Janet: Guess why I'm calling.
        Larry: *I* know cuz I didn't do my math.
        Janet: Well — u — how w'd *I* know. I wasn't et th' *school* today.
        Larry: *Oh:*
        Janet: Right?
        Larry: Right.
→   Janet: hhh But I *am* calling about math.
        Larry: I *knew* it:

(real data, Koutoupis-Kitis 1982).

As I argued in the past (Koutoupis-Kitis 1982; Kitis 1983), connectives functioning at a discoursal level and acting as organizational operators can function across several turns in discourse and their function can address a total meaning gleaned from several turns as in (27).[39]

In this paper, however, I only considered a brand of conceptual meaning of coordinate connectives and suggested that their core import be determined within an evaluative frame semantics. That cognitive framing, although reflected and guided by language is not inherently linguistic (Fauconnier and Turner 1998), is more than obvious. And that this proposal transgresses the linguistic limits and limitations is also obvious. I trust, nevertheless, that it puts forth a worthy, desirable, and possibly attainable prospect.[40]

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Acknowledgments

Notes

1.   I call conjunctive elements *connectives* (cf. van Dijk 1977, 1979) because the term sounds more neutral, hardly presupposing or invoking a particular kind of interpretation. Matthiessen and Thompson (1988) call them 'clause combinations' for exactly the same reasons, but in my view this term highlights a particular interpretation of the function of connectives, namely that of combining clauses, the syntactic function. As has been

amply demonstrated (cf. van Dijk 1977, 1979; McTear 1980; Kitis 1982, 1987a; Schiffrin 1987 — to cite only the earlier works, and no doubt many others), connectives need not combine or conjoin syntactic or semantic structures or any type of formal constituents as syntactic or semantic operators do. I nevertheless wish to be rather conservative and draw a line between what have been traditionally regarded as connectives and what, for example, Fraser (1990, 1996, 1999) would call discourse markers or pragmatic markers.

2. For an extensive critique and alternative proposals, see Koutoupis-Kitis (1982), abridged in Kitis (1989) and (1983). Also my presentations at LAGB Autumn Meeting 1984, 1st IPrA Conference, 1985, Viareggio, LAGB Autumn Meeting 1985. In Kitis (1982) I distinguish between two uses of *therefore*, the argumentative or inferential one and the explanatory or causal one (repeated in Blakemore 1987). In both cases I stress the enthymematic form involved in the use of *therefore*. In Kitis (1982) I also discuss sources of implicatures. As I claimed (Kitis 1982), many instances of Grice's particularized conversational implicature amounted to little more than general background knowledge, what Sperber and Wilson (1986) identified as contextual assumptions, on the basis of which language is interpreted. As I took the view that such implicatures were bogus, I argued that they should be part of our frame and scriptal knowledge accessed in particular instances. I proposed the maxim of relevance and speaker-intentionality (cf. Davis 1998) as the pivotal parameters in generating particularized conversational implicatures.

3. Within an overall perspective on connectives, I would class Grice's (1989) further remarks on connectives in terms of higher order speech acts as applying to the interpersonal level of language use.

4. I have also claimed that her thesis needs to be extended to the conversation-organizational level as well (Kitis 1996, forthcoming [a]).

5. Their function as speech act organizing operators was pointed out by Austin (1962) and later by Searle (1976), and only more recently their function as organizational operators at the level of conversation was pointed out.

6. See Fairclough (1989: 131) who writes that logical connectors "can cue ideological assumptions". See also recently Malrieu (1999).

7. An anonymous reviewer suggested that it is the concept encoded by 'communist', rather than the use of the connective, that makes a particular ideology accessible. There is no doubt that many words incorporate an evaluative element as a part of their sense, thereby reflecting ideologies: 'The Contras were *freedom fighters/terrorists*' (cf. Lehrer and Lehrer 1995). Some researchers even include an evaluative element within the lexical meaning specifications (R. Lakoff 1971; Ducrot 1996 [in Žagar]; Malrieu 1999). However, ideological complexes may be activated by any linguistic item, depending on context (see Laclau's (1988) discussion of the signification of 'woman' in different co-texts: 'women and their families', 'women and oppression', 'women and unemployment', 'women and gays', 'women and blacks', etc. [my examples]). But the point I am making attaches to configurations of frames giving rise to synthetic evaluations. As will be seen in Section 6, ideologies can be represented in frames too, as compact doxastic communal attitudes or dispositions. It would help my readers to replace the second conjunct of (2) with a non-evaluative proposition: *He is a communist but I'll marry him.*

8. But as I pointed out in the past (1987a) in discussing connectives we have to shift our ground from cohesion to coherence relations.

9. "When we encounter a 'because' type word, we try to connect causally the two clauses. If we cannot make the connection because of a causal syntax violation, we postulate some set of unknown states and actions that would correctly complete the chain. These empty conceptualization holders become the primary candidates for inferences" (Schank and Abelson 1977: 28). A fine case of this type of connective and how it is exploited in forging ideological complexes is discussed in Kitis and Milapides (1997). It is interesting to note that such uses of 'because' can be translated into Greek by some causal connectives ('γιατί/yati', 'διότι/dioti') but not by the prototypical one ('επειδή/epiδi'). See Kitis (1994, 1996, forthcoming(a)).

10. In Kitis (1982) I have shown that conventional implicature too is variable. It is rather unfortunate that in an encyclopedia these notions should be confused (cf. Koktová 1998).

11. Q2 means, for Levinson (1995: 97) "what is simply described is stereotypically and specifically exemplified".

12. Indeed, this is an old claim. Wilks, in suggesting the adoption of a frame-like structure ('proto-text'), underlines "the persistent need for general pragmatic principles at the highest level" (1980: 159), which would seek to maximize information. He suggests the incorporation of the sort of "global rules of conversation investigated by Grice (1975)" (1980: 156).

13. The original example in Atlas and Levinson (1981: 39) is: "Mart turned the switch and the motor started" (39).

14. I use the term 'instantiation' because I claim that specific uses of causal connectives activate stereotypical knowledge expressible in conditional statements.

15. See Koutoupis-Kitis (1982) for an early attempt to incorporate frame theory in a theory of communication.

16. The evaluative dimension (as well as that of ideology) adopted here within an account of connectives is merely descriptive. It reflects ideological frames and has no affinities with an Althusserian view of ideology or an evaluative interpretation of language designed to bring out its deep meaning (Fairclough 1989, 1992); but see Dascal (1997) for criticism of Fairclough's approach.

17. On differences and affinities between knowledge and belief systems see Abelson (1979). According to Althusser (1971) the term 'ideology' would also cover background knowledge, as ideology slides into all human activity and it is identical with the 'lived' experience of human existence itself.

18. See Koutoupis-Kitis (1982) for insurmountable problems in accounting for coherence in terms of scripts at the level of adjacency pairs.

19. Naturally, I cannot discuss these various notions here, but they have all been used to represent knowledge. 'Frame' here is used as a cover term (introduced into linguistics primarily by Fillmore), since frames are often assumed to supply substance to other concepts. Dinsmore (1987) proposes frame theory to supplement mental spaces and Fauconnier (1997) subsequently adopts frames as structuring and organizing mental (see also Fauconnier and Turner 1998). Frames are nowadays formalized as Semantic Networks in cognitive science, which are regarded as more flexible structures.

20. It is interesting to note that apart from the coordinating conjunction *and/και* Modern Greek affords another connective *eno/ενώ* (subordinate), which, while occasionally used as a contrastive connective, can replace *και/and* in this specific function without detracting from its force. However, *eno* has to postpose the conjunct against which the first conjunct derives its significance: *She sleeps around eno(?while) she is married.* But as I have already shown (Koutoupi-Kitis 1999) this connective has currently also developed a coordinate conjunctive function. Just like the English *but,* its translational counterparts in Greek cannot be used in this case with the same force as *και/and* or *eno.*

21. For an analogous frame-theoretic account of some uses of definite descriptions, see Koutoupis-Kitis (1982) and Kitis (1987b, c). For a comprehensive critique of R. Lakoff's (1971) and G. Lakoff's (1971) accounts of conjunction in terms of presuppositions see Koutoupis-Kitis (1982) and Kitis (1983).

22. Notice how speaker involvement can be registered by replacing *but* with *and: He's short and he's an athlete.*

23. Incidentally, Malrieu (1999) uses this connective (*but*) to illustrate evaluative inconsistencies: *I know he is great but I just cannot stand him.*

24. For extensive criticism of Dascal and Katriel (1977) see Kitis (1982, 1983).

25. In actual fact it is not articulated as the conventional meaning of *and* does not allow it to articulate conflict.

26. If we adopted Fauconnier's terminology, we would say that the mental spaces involved, organized as they are by differential frames, resist to lending themselves to conceptual integration, i.e. blending, despite *and*'s coercion. *And* is a formal lexical item that effects formal blending at the level of grammar and this process parallels the process of blending at the conceptual level; naturally the two processes interact in intricate ways (Fauconnier and Turner 1998).

27. One of the anonymous reviewer's of this paper example was "He is a communist but he has small feet". See Section 9.

28. Of course, it goes without saying that frame-represented generalized beliefs/knowledge can vary depending on epochs, cultures, etc. For example the examples considered here would have to be reversed in the former USSR. One of the many difficulties besetting an account of frame-represented knowledge is the problem of the transition from generalized 'communal', so to speak, knowledge frames to the generation of subversive ones. Clearly, activity within subversive frames is marked by creativity — and creativity is constrained — whether it is in the domain of poetry or in the general domain of new ideas (or even new ideologies). Indeed, what are the parameters that will spawn new differentially shaped or subversive frames? I have a hunch that what is at issue here is prototypicality and periphery. The former reinforcing frames, the latter pulling towards their 'disintegration' and disformation. If this is so then 'subversiveness' is spawned by, or modelled on, 'normalcy' and 'prototypicality', and this is what differentiates it from 'illogicality' (total frame inconcoctability). Cf. also Johnson-Laird (1989) on creativity and analogical thinking.

29. Evidence for the propositional import of *and* in (21) is adduced from the fact that it can connect the adjacent propositions: *All he could talk about was logic and he'd never heard of relevance theory.*

30. It is interesting to note that a rhetorical use of *and* conveying irony still trades on its potential for subverting its prototypical function, but the irony would be generated also in conjunction with a differential ideological specification of the frame *linguist*.

31. In fact, what is debated is the completion of the frame's default-values and, in particular, its participant roles, the completion of which will in effect construct it and establish it in the particular case. Clearly, isolated individual frames can carry evaluations, for example the *promiscuity* frame carries its own evaluation, as does the *communist* frame, as a reviewer rightly pointed out. However, in the case of connectives we are concerned with the dynamic assemblage or configuration of frames or the dynamic construction of new ones (often abortive) which will generate differential evaluation. Moreover, evaluations are connected with notions such as (in)consistency, conformity/discrepancy, attraction/repulsion, or (in)compatibility as these may characterize relations between frames and/or their components.

32. My notion of goal was similar to Ducrot and associates' conclusion (Anscombre and Ducrot 1977; Roulet 1984). However, the difference is not merely terminological. It lies in our divergent orientations. Ducrot looks at utterances as potential arguments, but rather unconnected. For my part, I see, even in localized contexts, a discursive structure determined by pre-set discoursal goals. My account was arrived at independently.

33. See also Bach (1999) for criticism of Rieber (1997) and of a relevance-theoretic account.

34. Cf. Lakoff (1986) who promoted the coordinate-structure constraint from syntax to cognitive Fillmorean frame-semantic scenarios.

35. Cf. Dascal's (1983) threefold distinction between sentence meaning, utterance meaning and speaker's meaning. Also Levinson's (1995) three levels of meaning, resonating Lyons but also Dascal. But, as I have noted, whether the intermediate level of utterance meaning à la Dascal or utterance-type meaning à la Levinson is part of pragmatics or semantics is a moot point. What is of significance here is that this proposal is intended to occupy a place in this middle ground.

36. Consider the oft-cited fragment:

    Therapist$_1$:   What do you do?
    Patient$_1$:   I'm a nurse but my husband won't let me work.
    Therapist$_2$:   How old are you?
    Patient$_2$:   Thirty one this December.
    Therapist$_3$:   What do you mean he won't let you work?

    It is worth noting that T_2 responds, not to P_1's utterance, but rather to the hypo-text constructed in it and projecting into other discourses. The use of *but* here is discussed in Kitis (1987a).

37. But as Malrieu (1999) notes, Artificial Intelligence has paid very little attention to evaluative attitudes and rhetorical attitudes to date.

38. Malrieu (1999) has shown that the evaluative role of connectives in discourse can be integrated within a connectionist model.

39. For a recent account of connectives operating globally see Lenk (1998).

40.   The perspective proposed here is not only congruent with, but also embraces a
       constructional analysis of the type of antinomial conjuction discussed here, as its
       semantics is constructional and frame-based.

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